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Granholm v. Heald
(03-1116)
Ruling Below: (Heald v. Engler, 6 th Cir., 342 F.3d 517, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17965, 2003
FED App. 0308P)
The court held that Michigan's regulations governing distribution of alcohol violated the
dormant Commerce Clause by preventing out-of-state wineries from shipping wine directly to
Michigan consumers. The regulations are facially discriminatory toward out-of-state wine sellers
and a re n ot " saved" b y the T wenty-first A mendment, which allows s tates to regulate alcohol
distribution and consumption within its borders.
Question Presented: Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries to ship
alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant
Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 21s" Amendment?
Eleanor HEALD, et al., Appellants,
V.
John ENGLER, in his official capacity as Governor, et al., Appellees, Michigan Wine and
Beer Wholesalers Association, Intervening Appellee
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Decided August 28, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge:
In this civil rights action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs raise a
constitutional challenge to Michigan's
alcohol distribution system, contending that
state provisions differentiating between in-
state and out-of-state wineries violate the
Commerce Clause. These regulations
prohibit the direct shipment of alcoholic
beverages from out-of-state wineries, while
allowing in-state wineries to ship directly to
consumers, provided that the in-state
wineries comply with certain minimal
regulatory requirements. The plaintiffs, who
include wine connoisseurs, wine journalists,
and one small California winery that ships
its wines to customers in other states, claim
that this system is unconstitutional under the
dormant Commerce Clause because it
interferes with the free flow of interstate
commerce by discriminating against out-of-
state wineries. The defendants, who include
Michigan officials (referred to collectively
in this opinion as "the state") and the
intervening trade association, argue in
response that Michigan's regulatory scheme
is constitutional under the Twenty-first
Amendment to the federal constitution.
[U.S. District and Circuit courts have split
on this issue, with the 4 th and 11h Circuits
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striking down statutes in North Carolina and
Florida, respectively, as unconstitutional.
The 7th Circuit found Indiana's scheme
constitutional, while the S.D.N.Y. and the
S.D. Tex. rejected their states' schemes.]
The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, and the district court granted the
state's motion and denied the plaintiffs
motion. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to
reconsider, arguing that the district court
should have addressed cross motions to
strike various evidence submitted by the two
sides prior to the summary judgment
decision. The district court denied the
motion to reconsider, noting that it had
effectively denied the cross-motions to
strike as moot, because it did not consider
the challenged evidence in deciding the
summary judgment motions.
The plaintiffs now appeal both the grant of
summary judgment and the denial of their
motion to reconsider. For the reasons set out
below, we conclude that the regulations in
question are discriminatory in their
application to out-of-state wineries, in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause,
and cannot be justified as advancing the
traditional "core concerns" of the Twenty-
first Amendment. We therefore reverse the
district court's judgment and remand the
case with directions to the district court to
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
I. Procedural and Factual Background
Michigan regulates alcohol sales under a
"three-tier system": consumers must
purchase alcoholic beverages from licensed
retailers; retailers must purchase them from
licensed wholesalers; and wholesalers must
purchase them from licensed manufacturers.
This system is similar to that used by most
states. [...]
The plaintiffs allege that Michigan's system
discriminates against out-of-state wineries in
favor of in-state wineries because it prevents
out-of-state wineries from shipping wine
directly to Michigan consumers, which in-
state wineries are allowed to do. As the
district court correctly noted, this distinction
between in-state and out-of-state wineries
can only be understood by reading a number
of provisions in conjunction with each other.
[The court cited the applicable Michigan
regulations, which provide an out-of-state
wine seller the opportunity to obtain an
"outstate seller of wine license." This
license, however, only permits the seller to
ship wine to a licensed wholesaler at the
address of the licensed premises. There is no
procedure whereby an out-of-state wine
seller can obtain approval to ship wine
directly to Michigan consumers.]
The plaintiffs contend that this differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state
wineries violates the dormant Commerce
Clause because it gives in-state wineries a
competitive advantage over out-of-state
wineries. In-state wineries can, for example,
bypass the price mark-ups of a wholesaler
and retailer, making in-state wines relatively
cheaper to the consumer and allowing them
to realize more profit per bottle. In addition,
the cost to an out-of-state winery of the
license that enables it to sell to a Michigan
wholesaler is $300, while a comparable
Michigan winery must pay only a $25
license fee to qualify to ship wine directly to
Michigan c ustomers. Finally, for customers
who desire home delivery, Michigan
wineries have a competitive advantage over
out-of-state wineries that cannot ship
directly to customers. In response, the state
argues that the regulations to which an in-
state winery is subject "more than offset,
both in costs and burden, any nominal
commercial advantage given by the ability
to deliver directly to customers" and
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characterizes the burden on out-of-state
wineries as "de minimis."
In its order granting summary judgment to
the state and denying summary judgment to
the plaintiffs, the district court held that
"Michigan's direct shipment law is a
permitted exercise of state power under § 2
of the 2 1st Amendment" because it is not
"mere economic protectionism." In
reaching this conclusion, the court found
that Michigan's statutory scheme was
designed "to ensure the collection of taxes
from out-of-state wine manufacturers and to
reduce the risk of alcohol falling into the
hands of minors."
After this order had issued, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to reconsider, asking the
district court to rule on the motions to strike
before granting either side summary
judgment and to "make specific findings of
fact based on the record" before reaching a
final decision. The plaintiffs argued that the
district court's failure to rule on the motions
to strike "left the record devoid of evidence
supporting the court's conclusion that the
direct shipment law furthers legitimate 2 1st
Amendment purposes," and that the court
had applied the incorrect legal standard in
dismissing the complaint. The district court
denied the plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration, saying that it had not
considered the challenged evidence in ruling
on the summary judgment motions and that
the motions to strike were effectively denied
as moot.
For the reasons set out below, we reverse the
district court's judgment, vacate the order
granting summary judgment in the state's
favor, and remand the case for entry of
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
II. Discussion
The central question in this case is how the
"dormant" Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-first Amendment interact to limit
the ways in which a state can control alcohol
sales and distribution. Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the United State Constitution
grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes..." The Supreme Court has long held
that "this affirmative grant of authority to
Congress also encompasses an implicit or
'dormant' limitation on the authority of the
States to enact legislation affecting interstate
commerce." Healy v. The Beer Institute,
491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1, 109 S.Ct. 2491, 105
L.Ed.2d 275 (1989).
[The court reviewed the history of the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding the
Twenty-first Amendment. At the beginning,
the states were given almost limitless power
to regulate alcohol, but in the 1960s, the
Court broke with that line of reasoning,
eventually adopting a balancing test of the
interests of the state in controlling alcohol
sales and the interest of the Federal
government in regulating interstate
commerce. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d
580 (1984).]
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has
continued to analyze challenges to state
alcohol laws by determining how closely
related the law in question is to the "core
concerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment.
Shortly after Capital Cities was decided, the
Court i ssued Bacchus Imports v. D ias, 468
U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200
(1984), in which out-of-state wholesalers
challenged a Hawaii excise tax exemption
for certain locally produced alcohol
beverages. The state argued that the statute
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advanced legitimate state interests, that is
imposed no patent discrimination against
interstate trade, and that the effect on
interstate commerce was minimal. Id. at
270, 104 S.Ct. 3049. The Court rejected
these defenses, finding that "the legislation
constitutes 'economic protectionism' in
every sense of the phrase," id. at 272, 104
S.Ct. 3049, and noting that "one thing is
certain: The central purpose of the [2 1st
Amendment] was not to empower States to
favor local liquor industries by erecting
barriers to competition." Id. at 276, 104
S.Ct. 3049. Instead, the Court considered
"whether the principles underlying the
[Twenty-first] Amendment are sufficiently
implicated by the [tax exemption] to
outweigh the Commerce Clause principles
that would otherwise be offended." Id. at
275, 104 S.Ct. 3049. In Bacchus, the state
did not contest that the law's purpose was
"to promote a local industry," so the Court
did not have to engage in the normal
Commerce Clause analysis of whether the
law was sufficiently closely related to the
promotion of lawful interests to vitiate its
discriminatory effect. Instead, it found that
the law discriminated against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.
Since Bacchus, the Supreme Court has been
less than prolific in construing the content of
the Twenty-first Amendment's "core
concerns," addressing the definition of "core
concerns," only once - and then only in a
plurality opinion. In North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 110 S.Ct. 1986, 109
L.Ed.2d 420 (1990), the Court had before it
an intergovernmental immunity case, rather
than a Commerce Clause challenge. At issue
was whether North Dakota's reporting and
labeling requirements were constitutional,
despite interfering with contrary federal
interests in selling liquor to military
personnel. The Court upheld the statute,
finding that the state regulations "fall within
the core of the State's power under the
Twenty-first Amendment" because they
were enacted "[i]n the interest of promoting
temperance, ensuring orderly market
conditions, and raising revenue...." Id. at
432, 110 S.Ct. 1986.
But, because North Dakota did not involve a
Commerce Clause challenge, the analysis in
the plurality opinion cannot be taken to
control the analysis in this case. That is, we
do not interpret the "in the interest of'
language to mean that a state need only be
motivated by the "core concerns" of the
Twenty-first Amendment to shield its laws
from constitutional scrutiny. Under a
Commerce Clause analysis, facially
discriminatory laws are still subject to strict
scrutiny, meaning that the state must
demonstrate that no reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives are available
to advance the same legitimate goals. See,
e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
336-7, 99S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979)
(finding that, "[a]t a minimum," a statute
that "on its face discriminates against
interstate commerce ... invokes the strictest
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local
purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives"). Likewise,
the language in North Dakota to the effect
that the state had "virtually complete
control" over the importation and sale of
liquor, although heavily emphasizes by the
district court in this case, has little value in a
case requiring a Commerce Clause analysis.
Because North Dakota did not involve
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, we
reject the implication that a state's "virtually
complete control" over liquor regulation
enables it to discriminate against out-of-state
interests in favor of in-state interests.
Bacchus simply forbids such an analysis.
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Given this background, we cannot endorse
the district court's characterization of the
regulation in this case as a constitutionally
benign product of the state's three-tier
system and, thus "a proper exercise of
[Michigan's Twenty-first Amendment]
authority, despite the fact that such a system
places a minor burden on interstate
commerce." Instead, we invoke Justice
Scalia's view, expressed in an opinion
concurring in the Supreme Court majority's
decision striking down a state price-
affirmation statute, in which he explained
that:
[The law's] invalidity is fully established
by its facial discrimination against
interstate commerce... This is so despite
the fact that the law regulates the sale of
alcoholic beverages, since its
discriminatory character eliminates the
immunity afforded by the Twenty-first
Amendment.
Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 344,
109 S.Ct. 2491, 105 L.Ed.2d 275 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
The proper approach in this case, then, is to
apply the traditional dormant Commerce
Clause analysis and, if the provisions are
unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause, to determine whether the state has
shown that it has no reasonable
nondiscriminatory means of advancing the
"core concerns" of the Twenty-first
Amendment.
[The court argued that statutes that facially
discriminate are "virtually per se" invalid,
and so the starting point for analysis using
the dormant Commerce Clause is whether
the state regulation directly or in effect
purpose treats in-state interests differently
than out-of-state interests.]
Here, it is clear that the Michigan statutory
and regulatory scheme treats out-of-state
and in-state wineries differently, with the
effect of benefiting the in-state wineries and
burdening those from out of state. As
discussed above, Michigan wineries enjoy
both greater access to consumers who with
to have wine delivered to their homes, and
greater profit through their exemption from
the t hree-tier s ystem. O ut-of-state wineries,
on the other hand, must participate in the
costly three-tier system, to their economic
detriment and, although this is not clear
from the record, may be shut out of the
Michigan market altogether if unable to
obtain a wholesaler. The Fourth Circuit
reaches a similar conclusion in a case
considering North Carolina's alcohol
distribution system, which is nearly identical
to Michigan's. In Beskind v. Easley, 325
F.3d 506 (4th Cir.2003), the court found that
North Carolina's alcohol distribution laws,
which discriminate against out-of-state
wineries in favor of in-state wineries, are
unconstitutional unless "the State can show
that it advances a legitimate local purpose
that cannot be adequately served by
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."
Id. at 515.
Having determined that the provision is
facially d iscriminatory, we now t urn tot he
question of whether the regulatory scheme is
nevertheless constitutional because it "fall[s]
within the core of the State's power under
the Twenty-first Amendment," having been
enacted "in the interest of promoting
temperance, ensuring orderly market
conditions, and raising revenue," North
Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432,
110 S.Ct. 1986, 109 L.Ed.2d 420 (1990),
and because these interests "cannot be
adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." New
Energy Co. of Ind. V. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 278, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302
(1988).
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We conclude, based on the evidence in the
record, that defendants have not shown that
the Michigan scheme's discrimination
between in-state and out-of-state wineries
furthers any of the concerns listed above,
much less that no reasonable non-
discriminatory means exists to satisfy these
concerns. This is so even if, taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to
defendants, we assume that all of the
evidence they submitted was admissible. It
is important to keep in mind that the relevant
inquiry is not whether Michigan's three-tier
system as a whole promotes the goals of
"temperance, ensuring an orderly market,
and raising revenue," but whether the
discriminatory scheme challenged in this
case-the direct-shipment ban for out-of-
state wineries--does so. See, e.g., Beskind,
325 F.3d at 517 ("The question is not
whether North Carolina can advance its
regulatory purpose by imposing fewer
burdens on in-state wineries than out-of-
state wineries.... Rather, the question is
whether discriminating in favor of in-state
wineries ... serves a Twenty-first
Amendment interest."). Obviously, the state
bears the burden of justifying a
discriminatory statute, and "the standards for
such justification are high." New Energy
Co., 486 U.S. at 278, 108 S.Ct. 1803; see
also Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 553
(5th Cir.1994) (describing the burden of
proof faced by the state as "towering");
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337, 99
S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979)
("[F]acial discrimination by itself may be a
fatal defect.... [A]t a minimum [it] invokes
the strictest scrutiny.")
The district court correctly recognized that
state liquor laws are not completely immune
from Commerce Clause challenges, but it
placed too much reliance on Supreme Court
precedent that has specifically upheld the
three-tier distribution system, quoting North
Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. at 431,
110 S.Ct. 1986, for the proposition that the
states have "virtually complete control" over
the importation and sale of liquor. As we
noted above, however, North Dakota
involved a Supremacy Clause challenge and
did not implicate the Commerce Clause. It
therefore cannot be relied on in this case in
light of Supreme Court cases that do discuss
the interpretation of the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Commerce Clause,
such as Bacchus.
Nor do we find persuasive the district
court's reliance on three additional cases.
One, House of York, Ltd. v. Ring, 322
F.Supp 530 (S.D.N.Y.1970), is a district
court opinion that pre-dates Bacchus. ZThe
second, Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F.Supp.2d
1306 (M.D.Fla.2001), has subsequently been
reversed. See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311
F.3d 1104 (1 1 t' C ir.2002) (holding that the
state must show that an alcohol-distribution
statute that discriminates between in-state
and out-of-state wineries furthers core
concerns of the Twenty-first Amendment in
order to survive a Commerce Clause
challenge). The third, Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman- Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7t'
Cir.2000), is the sole federal court of
appeals decision to find that analogous
direct shipment laws are constitutional under
the Twenty-first Amendment. However,
Bridenbaugh is distinguishable on its facts,
and it has been criticized by several federal
courts for its failure to engage in the
requisite dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. See, e.g., Bolick v. Roberts, 199
F.Supp.2d 397, 408 (E.D.Va.2002) (finding
Bridenbaugh "improperly decided because it
does not rely on the established dormant
Commerce Clause analysis"); Dickerson v.
Bailey, 212 F.Supp.2d 673, 682 (S.D.
Tex.2002) (observing that in its
"concentration on Indiana's three-tiered
scheme ... [the court] did not discuss the last
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forty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence
relating to balancing and harmonizing the
dormant commerce clause and § 2 of the
twenty-first Amendment"), aff'd, Dickerson
v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.2003)
(finding that Bridenbaugh was factually
distinguishable from that case); Bainbridge
v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1114 n. 15 (11th
Cir.2002) (commenting that the court
"disagree[s] with the analytical framework
used in [Bridenbaugh]").
For example, Bridenbaugh did not involve
any out-of-state wineries as plaintiffs, and it
thus addressed only whether the Indiana
statute discriminated against customers who
wanted to have out-of-state wine shipped
directly to them. Furthermore, it appears the
Indiana statutes differ from the provisions at
issue here, as the court found that "Indiana
insists that every drop of liquor pass through
its three-tiered system and be subjected to
taxation." Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
Michigan, on the other hand, effectively
exempts in-state wineries from the three-tier
system, and exemption it does not extend to
out-of-state wineries. Finally, in contrast to
this case, the Bridenbaugh plaintiffs were
"concerned only with direct shipments from
out-of-state sellers who lack and do not
want Indiana permits." Id. at 854. By
contrast, the plaintiffs in this case are willing
to acquire Michigan permits and pay taxes
on wines shipped; they simply want to be
eligible for such permits on the same basis
as in-state wineries. For all of these reasons,
we do not find the opinion in Bridenbaugh
persuasive.
The district court in this case was correct in
finding that the Michigan alcohol
distribution system discriminates between
in-state and out-of-state interests to the
extend that in-state wineries may obtain
licenses to ship wine directly to consumers,
but out-of-state wineries may not and are
instead required to go through the more
costly three-tier system. What the district
court did not do was undertake the necessary
analysis that follows from such a finding.
Instead, it concluded that Michigan's system
"cannot be characterized as 'mere economic
protectionism,"' because the system furthers
the "core concerns" of the Twenty-first
Amendment. The district court's observation
that "[t]he Michigan Legislature has chosen
this path to ensure the collection of taxes
from out-of-state wine manufacturers and to
reduce the risk of alcohol falling into the
hands of minors" and its conclusion that
"the 2 1s' A mendment g ives itt he p ower to
do so," without more, do not constitute strict
scrutiny, as required by Supreme Court
precedent. It is not enough that the Michigan
Legislature has chosen this particular
regulatory scheme to further what are
legitimate objectives. The proper inquiry,
detailed above, is whether it "advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." New
Energy Co. of Ind. V Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 278, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302
(1988). We find no evidence on this record
that is does.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, we REVERSE
the judgment of the district court granting
summary judgment to the defendants and
REMAND the case for entry of judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs.
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Swedenburg v. Kelly
(03-1274)
Ruling Below: (Swedenburg v. Kelly, 2d. Cir., 358 F.3d 223, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2337)
The court held that New York's laws governing the distribution of alcohol were not in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause but were instead properly within the power granted to the
states by the Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. Requiring out-of-state wineries to
maintain a physical presence in the state is proper in order to prevent tax evasion and ensure that
alcohol is not directed into the hands of minors.
Question Presented: Does a state's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to
ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the
dormant Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 2 1st Amendment?
Juanita SWEDENBURG, et al, Petitioners
V.
Edward F. KELLY, Chairman of the State Liquor Authority, Division of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, State of New York, in his official capacities, et al., Respondents
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided February 12, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
WESLEY, Circuit Judge:
This case requires us to reconcile the
competing demands of the Twenty-first
Amendment's grant of authority to the states
to regulate the intrastate traffic of alcohol,
with the power reserved to Congress under
the Commerce Clause "to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States."
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Thus, we must
determine whether New York's alcohol
regulatory regime, insofar as it relates to the
direct shipment of wine to New York
consumers, is properly within the scope of
section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment,
such that it is exempted from "the normal
operation of the Commerce Clause," or
more precisely, the dormant Commerce
Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206,
50 L. Ed. 2d 397, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). We
conclude that the challenged regime is
within the ambit of the Twenty-first
Amendment and also does not violate the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. We hold,
however, that section 102(1)(a) of the
State's regulatory regime violates the First
Amendment insofar as it prohibits all
commercial speech pertaining to the sale of
alcoholic beverages directed to New York
consumers by unlicensed entities.
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Background
A. New York's Regulatory Regime
Shortly following the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment, New York, like
most states, adopted a three-tiered system
for the sale and distribution of alcoholic
beverages. See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law §
100(1) (McKinney 2000). One of the
fundamental principles of the system is that
all sales of alcohol within New York must
be made to or by state-licensed entities. To
this end, section 100(1) of New York's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (the "ABC
Law") provides that "no person shall
manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or
retail any alcoholic beverage within the state
without obtaining the appropriate license
therefor required by this chapter." Id.
Section 102(1)(c) of the ABC Law also
provides in relevant p art that "no alcoholic
beverages shall be shipped into the state
unless the same shall be consigned to a
person duly licensed hereunder to traffic in
alcoholic beverages." Id. In addition, the
ABC Law prohibits a common carrier or any
other person from bringing or carrying any
alcoholic beverages into the state "unless the
same shall be consigned to a person duly
licensed hereunder to traffic in alcoholic
beverages." Id. § 102(l)(d).
Generally, the license application process is
rigorous to ensure that only reputable
individuals and their companies enter the
alcoholic beverage trade. Applicants must
identify any person with an interest in the
business along with the sources of funds
used in the licensed business. Id. §
110(l)(g). Licensees must also post an
appropriate penal bond that may be subject
to forfeiture for violation of the ABC Law or
State Liquor Authority ("SLA") regulations.
Id. § 112; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.
9, §§ 81.1-81.7 (2003). A conviction for a
felony or certain misdemeanors precludes a
person from obtaining a license, N.Y. Alco.
Bev. Cont. Law § 126(1) (McKinney 2000),
and any person who commits a violation of
the ABC Law cannot obtain a license for a
period of two years. Id. § 126(5).
Additionally, licensees must maintain
adequate books and records on their
premises and make them available for
inspection by the SLA. Id. §§ 103(7),
104(10), 105(15), 106(12). These
requirements facilitate the SLA's role in
generating and collecting tax revenue, and in
ensuring that licensees comply with the
provisions of New York's regulatory
scheme.
Section 76 of the ABC Law sets forth the
requirements for obtaining a New York
winery license. As defined under the ABC
Law, a licensed winery is one that has paid
the required licensing fee, id. §76, and "has
and maintains a branch factory, office or
storeroom within the state of New York and
receives wine in this state consigned to a
United States government bonded winery,
warehouse or storeroom located within the
state." Id. § 3(37). Licensed wineries enjoy
important privileges in New York's
regulatory scheme. For example, a licensed
winery may sell and ship its wine to another
licensed winery, a wholesaler or a retailer.
Id. § 77(1). More importantly, however, a
licensed winery may also obtain a retail
license, allowing it to sell and ship its wines
directly to consumers. Id. §§ 76(4), 77(2).
Thus, unlike in other states, out-of-state
wineries are permitted to seek and obtain a
New York license to distribute and sell
alcohol. They must, however, comply with
the licensing requirements of the ABC Law,
including establishing and maintaining a
physical presence in New York.
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B. Decision Below
Plaintiffs-appellees, Juanita Swedenburg and
David Lucas, proprietors of two out-of-state
wineries, and Patrick Fitzgerald, Cortes
DeRussy and Robin Brooks, New York
wine consumers, filed this action against
New York State seeking a declaration that
sections 102(1)(a), (c) and (d) of New
York's ABC Law are facially
unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs-
appellees claim sections 102(l)(c) and (d)
violate the dormant Commerce Clause
because they prevent the winery plaintiffs-
appellees from shipping their wine products
directly to New York consumers. The
wineries contend that based on their size
Swedenburg estimates New York sales of
only 120 to 180 bottles of wine a year -
direct sales to consumers through a website
or the mail are their only possible access to
the New York market. Thus, plaintiffs-
appellees argue the licensing scheme
provides an unconstitutional advantage to
in-state wineries and is not "saved" by the
Twenty-first Amendment. [...J
State defendants and intervening defendants,
wholesale distributors of alcohol,
(collectively, "defendants-appellants"),
argue that the regulatory scheme operates
even-handedly with respect to in-state and
out-of-state interests, and thus does not
improperly discriminate against out-of-state
wineries. Defendants-appellants further
argue that, in any event, the regulatory
scheme is excepted from dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny, as it is a proper
exercise of the State's authority under the
Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the
importation and distribution of alcohol for
delivery or use within its borders.
The district court granted plaintiffs-
appellees' motion [for summary judgment].
See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d
135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Relying on the
method of analysis utilized by a number of
other federal courts in similar challenges,
the district court first found that the New
York regime directly discriminated against
interstate commerce. Id. at 145. The court
then held that the ban on direct shipment of
out-of-state wine by non-licensed wineries
did not "implicate the State's core concerns
under the Twenty-first Amendment," and
thus, the ban was not insulated from a
dormant Commerce Clause attack. Id. at
148.
The court rejected the State's contention that
the "presence" requirement of the statute
cured its alleged discriminatory effect. "It
appears unreasonable to this Court to require
that an out-of-state winemaker 'become a
resident in order to compete on equal
terms."' Id. at 146 (quoting Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64,
72, 10 L. Ed. 2d 202, 83 S. Ct. 1201 (1963)).
The district court noted that the Supreme
Court has viewed with substantial
suspicion state statutes requiring that
business operations be performed in the
regulating state that could more efficiently
be performed elsewhere. Id. [...]
Discussion
I. Constitutionality of the Regulatory
Scheme Under the Twenty-first
Amendment
A. Analytical Framework
[The court reviewed the decisions of five
other U.S. Circuit courts on similar cases. It
found that all but one had adopted a two-
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step approach to the analysis, first
determining whether the regulation affected
interstate commerce in a discriminating
manner and only then looking to the
Twenty-first Amendment to "save" the
statute, if it advanced one of the
Amendment's "core concerns." The court
rejected this analysis and adopted the view
that the two pieces of the Constitution
should be considered in light of each other.]
B. The Legal History of the Twenty-first
Amendment
[The court reviewed the history of the
Twenty-first Amendment, noting that
Section 2 is what directly gives states the
power to regulate the importation of liquor.]
C. Analysis
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
grants "the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale
of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system." California Retail
Liquor Dealers A ss'n v. Midcal A luminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110, 63 L. Ed. 2d 233,
100 S. Ct. 937 (1980). This constitutional
grant of authority should not, we think, be
subordinated to the dormant Commerce
Clause inquiry when the two provisions
conflict, as they do here. Plaintiffs-appellees
argue that the scope of section 2's grant of
authority to the states has been narrowed by
a series of Supreme Court decisions. The
end result, they posit, is that a state law
regulating the importation of interstate
liquor is a proper exercise of the state's
section 2 power only if it regulates in a non-
discriminatory manner and is intended to
advance the "core concerns" of the Twenty-
first Amendment - namely temperance, the
promotion of orderly market conditions, and
revenue production. See North Dakota V.
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432, 109 L. Ed.
2d 420, 110 S. Ct. 1986 (1990) (plurality
opinion).
We disagree with the proposition that the
Supreme Court's Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence confines the scope of section 2
to state regulations that advance so-called
core concerns. In our view, although the
Supreme Court's Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence has to some degree cabined
the s cope of section 2, it h as d one so only
insofar as it has limited section 2's grant of
authority to its plain language. That is, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized
only that, under section 2, a state may
regulate the importation of alcohol for
distribution and use within its borders, but
may not intrude upon federal authority to
regulate beyond the state's borders or to
preserve fundamental rights.
1. Early Twenty-first Amendment
Jurisprudence
[The court reviewed decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the years immediately
following the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, finding that they gave broad
powers to states to regulate alcohol traffic,
even when out-of-state interests were
adversely affected.]
2. Contemporary Twenty-first
Amendment Jurisprudence
We acknowledge that more recent cases
have recognized that the Twenty-first
Amendment is not a plenary grant of
authority to states to regulate all activity
involving alcohol. As the Supreme Court
has noted, "[o]nce passing beyond
consideration o ft he Commerce C lause, the
relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to
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other constitutional provisions becomes
increasingly doubtful." [...]
Similarly, in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 3 77 U.S. 3 24, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 350, 84 S. Ct. 1293 (1964, the Court
struck down New York's attempt to prohibit
the sale of liquor to internationally-bound
travelers at a duty-free airport shop
operating under the supervision of the
United States Bureau of Customs. Id. at 329.
In so holding, the Court rejected the view
that "the Twenty-first Amendment has
somehow operated to 'repeal' the
Commerce Clause wherever regulation of
intoxicating liquors is concerned." Id. at
331-32. Such a view, the Court declared,
would effectively strip Congress of its
"regulatory power over interstate or foreign
commerce in intoxicating liquor." Id. at
332. [..]
In Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 12 L. Ed. 2d
362, 84 S. Ct. 1247 (1964), the Court
invalidated a state law seeking to impose a
tax on alcohol imported from Scotland on
the ground that it violated the Constitution's
Export-Import Clause. Id. at 346. The Court
reiterated it had "no doubt" that Kentucky
could regulate alcohol "destined for
distribution, use, or consumption within its
borders." Id. Section 2, however, did not
give the state the power to impose a tax
"clearly of a kind prohibited by the Export-
Import Clause." Id. at 343. [...]
Two decades after Idlewild and James B.
Beam Distilling, the Court reemphasized the
view that the Twenty-first Amendment is
not without limits when a state regulatory
scheme conflicts with valid federal
concerns. In California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 63 L. Ed. 2d 2 33, 100 S. Ct.
937 (1980), the Court, upon finding that a
California wine-pricing program violated the
Sherman Act, considered whether section 2
"permit[ted] California to countermand the
congressional policy adopted under the
commerce power - in favor of competition."
Id. at 106. Ultimately, the Court concluded
that because federal antitrust concerns
animating the Sherman Act outweighed
California's desire to protect small liquor
retailers from predatory pricing schemes of
larger retailers, section 2 could not salvage
the offending statute. Id. at 114. Four years
later, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 81 L. Ed. 2d 580, 104 S. Ct.
2694 (1984), the Court echoed Midcal's
refrain, holding unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute that required in-state
television operators to delete advertisements
for alcoholic beverages contained in the out-
of-state signals that they retransmitted by
cable to Oklahoma subscribers. In striking
down the law, the Court reiterated that the
Twenty-first Amendment had not repealed
the Commerce Clause, and declared that
when a state statute does not directly
regulate the sale or use of liquor within the
state's borders, a conflicting exercise of
federal authority may prevail. Id. at 713, 104
S.Ct. 2694.
The Supreme Court has also viewed with
caution state attempts to invoke section 2 as
a pretext for economic protectionism. In
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263,
82 L. E d. 2 d 2 00, 104 S. C t. 3 049 (1984),
Hawaii imposed an excise tax on liquor
sales at wholesale, while exempting certain
locally produced alcoholic beverages. The
Court invalidated the Hawaiian tax on the
grounds that it was intended to "favor local
liquor industries," and therefore was
preempted by "strong federal interests in
preventing economic Balkanization" and
promoting a unified national market. Id. at
276. In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S.
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573, 90 L. Ed. 2d 552, 106 S. Ct. 2080
(1986), the Court struck down a New York
statute that required state-licensed distillers
to comply with a price schedule that
established prices for local liquor sales no
higher than the lowest price the distiller
charged in other states. The Court
recognized that the statute could, in effect,
control the prices of alcoholic beverages in
neighboring states. Id. at 582-84. Thus, the
Court concluded that the statute was an
impermissible extraterritorial attempt to
regulate liquor prices. [...]
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court
was called upon to resolve competing claims
of constitutional authority. In each, the
Court "limited" the scope of section 2 only
insofar as it related to a state's attempt to
regulate the traffic of alcohol outside of its
borders or in violation of other powers
reserved to the federal government.
However, in each case, the Court
unequivocally reaffirmed the principle that
insofar as section 2 permits each state to
regulate alcohol traffic within its borders it
"primarily created an exception to the
normal operation of the Commerce Clause."
Craig, 429 U.S. at 206. The Supreme Court
has neither held nor implied that laws
prescribing regulations for the importation
and distribution of alcohol within a state's
borders "are problematic under the dormant
commerce clause." Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d
at 853. Indeed, as the language of the
Amendment and the Court's jurisprudence
amply demonstrate, section 2's powers are
directed specifically towards intrastate
regulation and traffic of liquor.
This limited interpretation of section 2 is
consistent with the political and cultural
forces animating Prohibition and its
subsequent repeal by the Twenty-first
Amendment. That is, the impact of the
dormant Commerce Clause has always been
an i ssue relating tos tate efforts to regulate
the flow of liquor within its borders.
Following a series of federal statutory
efforts to provide states with the legal
wherewithal to regulate intrastate alcohol
traffic, the Eighteenth Amendment
prohibited the flow of alcohol on a national
level. With Prohibition's repeal, the drafters
of the Twenty-first Amendment crafted
section 2 to allow states the authority to
circumvent dormant Commerce Clause
protections, provided that they were
regulating the intrastate flow of alcohol.
3. New York's Regulatory Regime
New York's regulatory regime falls squarely
within the ambit of section 2's grant of
authority. The statutory scheme regulates
only the importation and distribution of
alcohol in New York. New York's
prohibition of the sale and shipment of wine
by unlicensed wineries directly to New York
consumers serves valid regulatory interests.
The statute allows the state to monitor the
distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages
by permitting such distribution and sale only
through state-licensed entities supervised by,
and accountable to, the SLA.
Although we are sensitive to the Supreme
Court's instruction that "[s]tate laws that
constitute mere economic protectionism are
... not entitled to the same deference as law
enacted to combat the perceived evils of an
unrestricted traffic in liquor," Bacchus, 468
U.S. at 276, we find no indication, based on
the facts presented here, that the regulatory
scheme is intended to favor local interests
over out-of-state interests. All wineries,
whether in-state or out-of-state, are
permitted to obtain a license as long as the
winery establishes a physical presence in the
state. Wine that is delivered to a branch
office or warehouse can then be shipped
directly to consumers.
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Presence ensures accountability. Records of
sales and compliance with New York's
regulatory requirements must be available
for inspection by SLA officials. Violations
are subject to disciplinary measures carried
out in New York, including fines imposed
against the bond all license holders are
required to post. New York treats wine
importers the same as it treats internal
sellers; all must either utilize the three-tier
system or obtain a physical presence from
which the state can monitor and control the
flow of alcohol.
We fully recognize that the physical
presence requirement could create
substantial dormant Commerce Clause
problems if this licensing scheme regulated
a commodity other than alcohol. When a
state statute, whether on its face or in effect,
discriminates against interstate commerce, it
is virtually per se invalid unless the State
can justify the discrimination "both in terms
of the local benefits flowing from the statute
and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory
alternatives adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake." Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Adver, Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
353, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 97 S. Ct. 2434
(1977).
Here, the requirement that all wine be
shipped through a New York warehouse is a
precondition to direct consumer sales. We
recognize that "state statutes requiring
business operations to be performed in the
home State that could more efficiently be
performed elsewhere ... ha[ve] been
declared to be virtually per se illegal." Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145, 25
L. Ed. 2d 174, 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970); see also
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383, 128 L. Ed. 2d 399, 114 S. Ct.
1677 (1994); South-Cent. Timber Dev. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 81 L. Ed. 2d 71, 104
S. Ct. 2237 (1984). But business efficiency
must give way to valid regulatory concerns
in this unique area of commerce. Under this
scheme, out-of-state wineries will incur
some costs in establishing and maintaining a
physical presence in New York, costs not
incurred by in-state wineries. These effects,
however, do not alter the legitimacy of
section 2's delegation of authority. While it
may be an additional expense for out-of-
state wineries to be present in New York,
they gain access to a market not available to
others direct sales to consumers. The fact
that some out-of-state wineries will have
greater costs than others (out-of-state or in-
state) in accessing the market is not
determinative. New York has chosen to
relax its regulatory grip for wineries to sell
directly to consumers. It has not barred out-
of-state wineries from the opportunity; it has
correlated its relaxation of regulatory
scrutiny with a safety net ensuring
accountability presence. See Milton S.
Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia,
319 U.S. App. D.C. 389, 91 F.3d 193, 204
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
New York's desire to ensure accountability
through presence is aimed at the regulatory
interests directly tied to the importation and
transportation of alcohol for use in New
York. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432
(plurality opinion) ("In the interest of
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly
market conditions, and raising revenue, the
State has established a comprehensive
system for the distribution of liquor within
its borders. That system is unquestionably
legitimate."). All wine will pass through a
warehouse located in New York, allowing
state officials access to the product. As
noted above, every licensee must maintain
books and records on premises available for
inspection at any time by the SLA.
In 2 000, t here w ere o ver 2,100 w ineries i n
the country, a 275% increase since 1975.
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Requiring New York officials to traverse the
country to ensure that direct sales to
consumers (no matter how small) comply
with New York law would render the
regulatory scheme useless. Section 2 does
not require that New York bear the burden
in attempting to ensure proper compliance
with its tax and regulatory system regarding
imported wine. New York's "motives of
legitimate state interests which would be
promoted by requiring [physical presence],
e.g., auditing company records, monitoring
compliance with the ABC laws, monitoring
licenses, checking tax forms for audits, etc.,
fall[] ... squarely within the state's core
enforcement powers over alcohol."
Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 203-04.
The winery plaintiffs presented compelling
proof that boutique wineries with limited
production of high quality wine have a niche
in an increasingly sophisticated national
market of wine connoisseurs. Facility of
travel and the Internet have made wineries
all over the nation available to those wishing
to visit and buy wine personally or in a
virtual sense. Indeed, a majority in both
houses of New York's legislature felt that
New York wineries (the vast majority of
which are quite small) would benefit from a
reciprocity statute that would allow direct
sales to consumers by unlicensed out-of-
state winenes from states allowing New
York wineries the same opportunity. See S.
3533-A, A-7411, 1995 Senate-Assembly
Bill (NY 1995). The governor chose to veto
the bill. See Governor's Veto # 76 (NY
1995). Changes in marketing techniques or
national consumer demand for a product do
not alter the meaning of a constitutional
amendment. If New York wishes to further
relax its regulatory control of the flow of
wine into New York, it can do so.
We hold that the challenged regulatory
scheme is within the ambit of the powers
granted to states by the Twenty-first
Amendment. New York's regulatory
scheme allows licensed wineries, whether
in-state or out-of-state, direct access to a
market of sophisticated oenophiles. The
scheme does so in a non-discriminatory
manner, while targeting valid state interests
in controlling the importation and
transportation of alcohol. Accordingly, we
conclude that New York has acted within its
authority under the Twenty-first
Amendment.
Conclusion
The district court's order of December 12,
2002, is hereby AFFIRMED in part and
REVERSED in part and the matter
remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
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Justices to Review Issue of Shipping Alcohol Interstate
The Wall Street Journal
May 25, 2004
Robert S. Greenberger
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide if wine
lovers may uncork out-of-state vintages
delivered directly via the Internet or by
telephone order. The justices said they will
review three similar cases involving
challenges to regulations on the books in
about half the states. Those rules require
consumers to buy alcoholic beverages only
from licensed in-state retailers. The case pit
the Constitution's 21st Amendment, which
ended Prohibition in 1933 and gave states
regulatory rule over alcoholic beverages,
against the Commerce Clause, which gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce.
There are more than 2,500 wineries in 49
states, according to one of the filings in the
case. As more small wineries seek to expand
their markets over the Internet, pressure for
deregulation is building. The challengers say
the rules violate their rights under the
Commerce Clause.
While regulation of alcohol beverages
always has been a special case because of
public safety concerns, the high court's
decision could have an impact on other
industries. Steven Simpson, senior attorney
for the Institute for Justice, which represents
some wineries and consumers in one of the
cases, pointed out that some state also
require mortgage brokers to have an in-state
office in order to do business, as opposed to
working over the Internet.
The National Beer Wholesalers Association
said in a brief filed in one of the cases that
"delicately balanced" state regulations serve
such important interests as "preventing
illegal sales to minors, inhibiting overly
aggressive marketing and consumption,
collecting taxes [and] creating orderly
distribution." Another brief filed by 36
states warned that deregulation would cut
state tax revenues at a time when budgets
are pressed.
The court has decided to step into the case in
part because of a split among six U.S.
appeals courts that have addressed the issue.
Four of the six have, to some extent, ruled to
overturn regulations. Most of the regulated
states use a three-tier system, under which
manufacturers sell their products to licensed
wholesalers, who sell them to licensed
retailers. Certain exceptions allow direct
sales.
The justices are expected to rule on the cases
during their next term, which begins in
October.
[ .. I
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Top court to rule on winery shipping;
Small vintners seek end to ban on direct out-of-state sales
The San Francisco Chronicle
May 25, 2004
Carol Emert
Virtually every day, David Jones of Lava
Cap Winery gets telephone calls from out-
of-staters who have visited his Placerville
tasting room and want a few bottles of wine
shipped to their homes.
Virtually every day, Jones has to turn down
one or m ore c ustomers from such states as
New York and Florida, explaining that their
1930s-era liquor-control laws prohibit his
wines from being delivered to their
doorsteps.
In a year's time, the situation could be much
better, or much worse, for wineries and
consumers. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
Monday to weight in on the legality of direct
alcohol shipping, and laws in at least half-a-
dozen states hang in the balance.
"It's an important issue for all of the wine
industry and for consumers," Jones said.
"The people o ft his country deserve access
to all wine, not just what the distributors
happen to want to bring in."
The battle over direct shipping, which has
been raging in courts and legislatures across
the country, pits wineries and consumers
who want to be able to buy and sell wine
freely against wholesale distributors and
state liquor-control authorities.
Distributors don't want to cede any of their
business to home deliverers like UPS and
FedEx, while some regulators worry about
sales-tax evasion and fear that minors could
order intoxicating beverages over the
Internet.
The issue is of particular import to the
country's more than 2,000 small wineries,
many of which have trouble attracting the
attention of distributors. Not only can some
wineries sell more goods by shipping direct,
they can double their profits by cutting out
wholesalers and retailers.
The Supreme Court accepted both direct-
shipping cases it had been petitioned to
hear-Granholm vs. Heald in Michigan and
Swedenburg vs. Kelly in New York-and
consolidated them into one.
The court said it would address the tension
in the U.S. Constitution between the
commerce clause, which prohibits
discrimination in interstate commerce, and
the 21st Amendment, which repealed
Prohibition and at the same time gave states
the authority to regulate beverage alcohol as
they wish.
In Michigan, New York and other states
where lawsuits have been heard, native
wineries are allowed to ship to their state's
residents, b ut o ut-of-state wineries must go
through the cumbersome and expensive
distributor-retailer network.
"It is an unfair situation that people who
don't have access to distributors should be
shut out of the market," said Patrick
Campbell, owner of Laurel Glen Winery in
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Glen Ellen and a shipping activist. "That's
not the American way."
The move toward the high court is the
culmination of years of litigation by a
grassroots movement of consumers,
wineries and attorneys who have been
protesting shipping bans in federal courts
around the country.
The wholesalers have
opponents, countering
with a vengeance.
State attorneys general
in, asking the Supreme
the issue. Earlier this
proven aggressive
each new lawsuit
also have weighed
Court for clarity on
year, 36 attorneys
general-some who favor direct shipping
and some who oppose it-filed a brief
asking the high court to rule on direct
shipping.
While results of the state lawsuits have been
mixed, most states have found prohibitions
on out-of-state shipping discriminatory.
Several anti-shipping laws have been
overturned in state legislatures or courts in
the last two years, bringing the number of
states with legal direct shipping to 26.
The high court's decision in the matter is
expected by the end of June 2005.
Depending on how broadly it is written, it
could affect pending lawsuits in Florida,
Ohio and New Jersey in addition to New
York and Michigan. It also could have an
impact on Indiana, which upheld a ban on
direct shipping several years ago.
Since the Michigan and New York cases
deal primarily with the issue of
discrimination, the decision won't have any
effect on states such as Pennsylvania that
forbid all wineries, both in-state and out-of-
state, from shipping to residents.
Craig Wolf, the wholesalers' attorney who
led the charge to the Supreme Court, was
unavailable for comment. But a
spokeswoman for the Wine and Spirits
Wholesalers of America trade association
said her members are optimistic.
"We believe it needs to be settled once and
for all whether the Constitution says what it
says, which is that states need to decide
what is in the best interest of their citizens
with regard to sales and distribution of
alcohol," said spokeswoman Karen Gravois.
Pro-shipping forces had hoped the Supreme
Court would wait to weigh in on the issue
until they had more victories in state courts
and legislatures. Attorneys also were
concerned that a majority of justices favor
states' regulatory rights more than free
trade. But yesterday, pro-shipping lawyers
said they are ready for the showdown.
While the timing isn't ideal, "I think we will
win the Supreme Court on this issue," said
Alexander Tanford, an attorney in the
Michigan case and a constitutional law
professor at Indiana University.
Tanford said the wording in the court's
agreement to accept the case made him more
confident, because it focuses on the potent
issue of discrimination and avoids side
issues that might have swayed some justices.
While it is impossible to predict a Supreme
Court vote, he said: "I am reasonably
confident at this point that there are at least
five justices who will, in fact, vote that the
21st Amendment does not give states power
to discriminate."
Wineries have a powerful ally in Kenneth
Starr, the former U.S. solicitor general and
special prosecutor who is best known for
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investigating former President Bill Clinton's
White House affair.
Starr, who is helping coordinate the
Supreme Court efforts on behalf of the wine
industry's Coalition for Free Trade and
Family Winemakers of America, said
yesterday in a conference call that he is
pulling strings in Washington to get support
for wine shipping.
Starr said he had already briefed staff at the
Federal Trade Commission on Monday. Last
year the FTC issued a report concluding that
state direct-shipping bans are anti-
competitive and finding few problems with
underage access to alcohol or tax evasion.
Starr said he would solicit friend of the court
briefs from the U.S. solicitor general, the
departments o f C ommerce and A griculture,
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau and senators and representatives
who are members of the congressional wine
caucus.
The many attorneys involved in the cases
now must decide who will argue before the
high court.
The top candidates are Starr, who has
appeared before the court many times;
Tanford; and Clint Bolick, the lead attorney
for the Institute of Justice, which brought the
New York case.
Separate briefs will be submitted in the
Michigan and New York cases, but only one
attorney may appear in oral arguments in
December, said Tanford.
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Justices Step Into Interstate Wine Rift
The New York Times
May 24, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
resolve an intensifying debate over whether
states can prohibit out-of-state wineries from
shipping directly to consumers. The eventual
decision could have implications beyond
wine sales for Internet commerce in general.
The appeals the justices accepted, from New
York and Michigan, are among some two
dozen cases now in courts around the
country challenging I aws that states d efend
as part of their authority to regulate the
liquor industry but that small wineries and
consumers have attacked as impermissibly
protectionist.
The constitutional doctrines that undergird
these positions are complex and
contradictory. The 2 1st Amendment, which
repealed Prohibition, gives states broad
authority to regulate the sale and use of
alcoholic beverages within their borders. But
the Commerce Clause, as long interpreted
by the Supreme Court, sharply limits the
ability of individual states to erect economic
barriers at their borders.
Not surprisingly, different courts have
reconciled these competing doctrines in
different ways, a circumstance that made the
Supreme Court's intervention all but
inevitable. The justices consolidated the
cases for a single argument to be heard late
next fall.
In the Michigan case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
Cincinnati, struck down the state's
interstate-shipment ban last August on the
ground that it amounted to unconstitutional
discrimination against interstate commerce.
Both the state government and the state's
beer and wine wholesalers appealed to the
Supreme Court; the cases are Granholm v.
Heald [...] and Michigan Beer and Wine
Wholesalers Association v. Heald [...].
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in Manhattan, upheld New
York's law in a ruling three months ago.
That court placed more emphasis on the
state's 2 1st Amendment powers and found
that the law was valid "within the ambit of
that authority." The court said New York's
law did not discriminate on its face because
it permitted any winery with a "physical
presence" in the state, such as an office, to
ship directly to consumers.
Clint Bolick, strategic litigation counsel of
the Institute for Justice, the libertarian
public-interest law firm that brought the
challenge tot he New York I aw, s aid in an
interview Monday that it was "ludicrous" to
suppose that his client, Juanita Swedenburg,
proprietor of a small Virginia vineyard,
could open an office in New York or any
other state.
"If you call her winery, she answers her own
phone," Mr. Bolick said.
The appeal, filed on behalf of Ms.
Swedenburg as well as a California
winemaker named David Lucas and three
New York wine consumers, is Swedenburg
v. Kelly [...].
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Mr. Bolick said a decision upholding the
state laws could permit states to erect
"serious barriers to e-commerce in general."
Viet D. Dinh, a law professor at Georgetown
University who is representing the
wholesale wine and liquor industry in
defense of the state laws in these cases, said
the Second Circuit's analysis in relying on
the states' 21st Amendment authority was
clearly correct. In an interview, Mr. Dinh, a
former assistant attorney general, said that
because alcohol was "unlike any other
product," a decision upholding the state laws
would not have implications for other types
of commerce, on the Internet or elsewhere.
While direct sales from wineries to
consumers are growing quickly as states
relax their prohibitions or lose court cases,
as Texas did last year, they are still a small
portion of all wine sales, $200 million out of
$18 billion last year. The stakes are
obviously high, however, both to the
wineries, which are motivated to avoid
sharing their profits with wholesalers, and to
the states. The National Conference of State
Liquor Administrators estimated in 2000
that states were losing tens of millions of
dollars in tax revenue from interstate wine
sales to consumers. Thirty-six states have
joined a brief filed by Ohio in support of
Michigan's appeal.
New York's attorney general, Eliot Spitzer,
filed a Supreme Court brief agreeing with
Ms. Swedenburg that the court should hear
the challenge to the New York law in order
to clarify the national situation. He urged the
court to uphold the law, however.
I _ ].
385
Wine & Spirits; Matters of Taste; The wine shipping news
Los Angeles Times
June 9, 2004
David Shaw
Supporters of laws that ban wineries from
shipping directly to consumers in many
states - especially wholesalers who now act
as middlemen and would like to have all
wine sales continue to go through them -
invoke all mainer of justification for their
position. They say they're trying to abide by
the United States Constitution and to ensure
that appropriate sales taxes are collected
and, above all, to help states "protect their
communities ... [and] safeguard their
children ... " as Juanita Duggan, president
and CEO of the Wine & Spirits Wholesalers
of America, said when the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed last month to hear two cases
that involve direct shipping.
Right. When all else fails, invoke those
poor, helpless kids. If the Supreme Court
rules against Duggan and her allies, I can
just see all those impatient 14-year-olds e-
mailing their orders to Napa and waiting
three weeks for their Screaming Eagle to
arrive.
When the Supreme Court takes up this case
later this year, justices will be reviewing just
two states' laws, but their ruling could affect
all 24 states that now forbid direct sales to
consumers. These states essentially rely on
the 21st Amendment, which repealed
Prohibition but threw a legislative bone to
the temperance movement by giving states
broad authority to regulate the sale of
alcoholic beverages within their borders.
I hope the court throws all those states' laws
out the window. I hope the justices rule that
wineries in California and elsewhere can
ship their wines directly to consumers in
every one of the 50 states.
A Federal Trade Commission study last year
said consumers could save "as much as 21%
on some wines" if they were able to buy
them directly from the wineries. That's why
wholesalers oppose the change; they'd lose
money if wineries could bypass them and
ship directly to individual consumers.
Although consumers in California probably
wouldn't be greatly affected by such a
decision - at I east n ot directly - i t's s till a
huge issue here. California is by far the
biggest wine-producing state in the country,
accounting for two-thirds of the nation's
wine sales. All the other states combined
produce only about 7% of the wine
consumed in the United States.
Direct shipping throughout the country
could be an enormous windfall for
California wineries, though, simply because
they could sell more wine to more
customers. This should make the wineries
healthier, and since the wine industry
contributes $33 billion to the state's
economy, the state's economy should get
healthier too.
But that's not why I favor eliminating the
ban on direct shipping. The ban just seems
discriminatory to me. Over the years, the
Supreme Court has generally interpreted the
Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution
in ways that limit such state-by-state
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discrimination - "economic Balkanization,"
the court called it in another case - and I
hope the justices will do likewise now.
If I lived in New York (or Michigan) - the
two states whose bans are the basis of the
pending Supreme Court case - why should I
only be able to direct-order wines made in
New York (or Michigan)? Why shouldn't I
be able to buy by phone, online or through
the mail any wine from California and
Oregon and Virginia and any other state that
makes wine that appeals to me? And why
shouldn't wineries be able to sell to anyone,
anywhere, who wants to drink their wines
and is willing to pay for them?
Even a favorable Supreme Court ruling
wouldn't allow foreign wineries to ship
directly to customers in the U.S. because
federal import and customs regulations, not
state laws, prevent that.
But if, like me, you tend to root for the
underdog - the little guy - in most
situations, there's another reason to hope the
Supreme Court overturns the direct shipping
ban within the United States.
Big fish, little fish
The big wineries, in California and
elsewhere, can survive under the current
system. They may not like it. They may be
able to make even more money if the system
is changed. But at least they're in the game.
The biggest 25% of the country's almost
3,000 wineries sell more than 80% of the
wines consumed nationwide, and
wholesalers are happy to work with them.
Most wineries are small, family-owned
operations, though, with volume so slight
that wholesalers don't find their business
worth taking.
These wineries get shut out of interstate
sales altogether under the current system;
they can't ship directly to consumers, and
they can't ship indirectly, through
wholesalers. Collectors and casual drinkers
alike should have direct access to these
wines.
Direct sales from wineries to consumers are
a relatively small piece of the wine pie at
present, accounting for only $200 million of
last year's $18 billion in total wine sales.
But that number would increase
significantly if wineries could sell directly to
consumers everywhere.
The Supreme Court should make that
possible.
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Time to Sober Up; The Constitution does let states stop cross-border alcohol sales
Legal Times
February 23, 2004
Brannon P. Denning
Most Americans probably think that legal
battles about Prohibition ended decades ago,
with the ratification of the 21st Amendment
to the Constitution. But two recent cases
from federal appeals courts, now headed
toward the Supreme Court, show that our
legal system is still grappling with issues
that it should have settled long ago. As they
decide whether to review o ne oft he c ases,
the justices need to realize that not just
regulation of alcohol, but what the
Constitution means, is on the line.
Consumers and alcohol providers allege that
Michigan's law [and similar ones, for
instance, in Virginia and New York] are
protectionist and unconstitutional, because
they violate the so-called "dormant
commerce clause doctrine." This judge-
made doctrine infers from the Constitution's
grant of congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce a corresponding set of
restrictions on states. At a minimum, the
Supreme Court has instructed, the doctrine
prevents states from restricting interstate
commerce by passing laws that explicitly
discriminate against such commerce, or by
passing facially neutral laws that have the
same discriminatory effects.
The doctrine is rooted in the presumption
that by granting such power to Congress, the
Framers intended to establish a national
market for goods and services free of
parochial or protectionist state barriers.
Since many direct-shipment bans, such as
Michigan's, contain exceptions for alcohol
produced in the state, those seeking to
overturn the laws allege that they represent
precisely the sort of blatant protectionism
that the dormant commerce clause doctrine
forbids. What these arguments overlook,
however, is the existence of the 21st
Amendment. The amendment authorizes
laws like Michigan's because it was
intended, where alcohol is involved, to
disable the dormant commerce clause
doctrine.
The 21st Amendment, which repealed
Prohibition, states in its second section:
"The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." The plain
text suggests that recent court decisions are
mistaken. Yet the courts tell us that the 21st
Amendment is not to be read literally or
invoked as a shield for protectionist
legislation. Only laws promoting
temperance, they say, are protected by the
amendment.
Where have courts gotten the idea for this
distinction - between "good" alcohol
legislation, which furthers the state's
"legitimate" core interest in temperance and
related alcohol oversight and taxation, and
"bad" legislation motivated by simple
economic protectionism? Certainly not from
the text of the amendment, which makes no
such distinction.
Nor can opponents enlist the aid of the
amendment's framers. The 21st Amendment
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was written in part to allay state concerns
that they would face renewed constitutional
challenges to their regulation of alcohol
shipped in interstate commerce, and so
constitutionalized state control over alcohol
imported into states.
Before Prohibition, in the 19th century,
alcohol consumers and shippers successfully
invoked the dormant commerce clause
doctrine against state attempts to halt the
burgeoning mail-order liquor trade. The
dormant commerce clause thus essentially
rendered dry states powerless to enforce
their liquor laws. In response, Congress
passed the Wilson Act in 1890 and the
Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913, which
effectively disabled the dormant commerce
clause doctrine as applied to interstate
shipments of liquor, and permitted states to
enforce their laws.
The Supreme Court upheld this legislation,
thus confirming the power of Congress, by
affirmatively exercising its power over
interstate commerce, to lift the inferred
restrictions on the states placed by the
dormant commerce clause doctrine. These
congressional efforts culminated in the
ratification of the 18th Amendment, which
inaugurated a 14-year experiment with
national prohibition. When enthusiasm for
Prohibition waned, state concerns about
their ability to control the alcohol trade re-
emerged.
THE 21ST AND THE STATES
Both proponents and opponents of repeal
agreed that the power to regulate alcohol
rightly belonged to the states. They made
sure to eliminate a provision from an early
version of the amendment that empowered
both the federal and state governments to
regulate "saloons." Both wet and dry
senators objected, noting the provision
would undermine the key purpose of the
amendment: to return control over liquor
regulation to the states.
With that important change, the "drys" were
assured that the dormant commerce clause
doctrine would not be revived to strike down
state regulatory efforts; the "wets," too, were
provided with constitutional assurances that
dry forces could not use federal power to re-
establish some form of prohibition in the
future. As the participants understood it, the
main question regarding alcohol regulation
was one of power. The 21st Amendment
settled it in favor of the states.
Early Supreme Court cases clearly reflected
that understanding. In State Board of
Equalization of California v. Young's
Market, decided in 1936, Justice Louis
Brandeis rejected arguments that the 21st
Amendment required a state, if it chose to
permit the sale of alcohol at all, to treat all
alcohol the same. The plaintiffs in Young's
Market were asking the Court to strike down
a $500 license fee imposed on importers of
out-of-state beer. Brandeis wrote that to
adopt the plaintiffs' arguments "would
involve not a construction of the [21st
Amendment], but a rewriting of it." In three
later cases - Mahoney v. Joseph Triner
Corp. [1938], Joseph S. Finch & Co. v.
McKittrick [1939], and Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission
[1939] - the Supreme Court subsequently
applied the core holding of Young's Market.
However, since a 1965 case, Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
suggested that the 21st Amendment had not
repealed the commerce clause despite the
holding in Young's Market, the Supreme
Court has not vigorously defended the
power reserved to the states by the
amendment. In 1984, the Court in Bacchus
Imports Ltd. v. D ias applied to a s tate law
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taxing alcohol the very dormant commerce
clause analysis that the amendment was
intended to foreclose. At no time has the
Court made a convincing case for the
correctness of its more recent decisions, and
it also has failed to expressly overrule
Young's Market.
Recent lower court decisions, like the 6th
Circuit's Engler and the District Court's
opinion in Swedenburg v. Kelly, have
indulged in still broader applications of the
Supreme Court's relatively small
encroachments on the 21st Amendment, and
erroneously concluded that those high court
decisions dictate the wholesale invalidation
of state liquor importation laws. The
growing market for interstate shipment of
alcohol, and the near unanimity of federal
courts in their continued assertions of the
21st Amendment's irrelevance, makes this
an appropriate time for a re-examination of
the amendment and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of it. Without a reaffirmance
of the agreement behind it, the amendment
will become a dead letter.
Were the issue simply one of cheap liquor
vs. expensive liquor, or whether states ought
to protect local economic interests as a
matter of policy, one might applaud the
actions of the lower courts. After all, the
dormant commerce clause doctrine is a
powerful judicial weapon designed to
enforce the common market vision of the
Constitution - and so much the better for the
nation.
But, as is often the case when means are
subordinated to ends in fashioning
constitutional law, there are real costs to the
approach the lower courts have adopted.
Those costs could amount to de facto
alcohol deregulation, which would quite
possibly allow for elimination of
longstanding, state-based safeguards against
underage access, as well as states' ability to
track and tax alcohol sales and ensure
product purity.
PAYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRICE
But there is an even more serious cost to
judicial abnegation of the 21st Amendment,
a cost to the integrity of the amending
.process itself If members of Congress who
propose amendments, and those in the states
who a re called upon to ratify t hem, cannot
be assured that the judiciary will respect the
"constitutional politics" of an amendment
when interpreting it, then one might forgive
them for asking whether it is worth going to
the trouble of proposing Article V
amendments at all. This would leave the
process of constitutional change entirely in
the hands of the judiciary and remove an
important popular check on the court
decisions.
Not only would the denigration of our
amending process be a loss for our
constitutional regime, but it might have
more ominous consequences for
constitutionalism in general. If the judiciary
is not bound to respect the words and intent
animating a relatively young amendment,
then why should the Constitution's other,
older textual boundaries command
observance? Thus, when contemplating the
fate of the 21st Amendment, it hardly seems
alarmist to wonder whether other parts of
the Constitution are similarly vulnerable to
judicial repeal.
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Ashcroft v. Raich
(03-1454)
Ruling Below: (Raich v. Ashcroft, 9th Cir., 352 F.3d 1222, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25317)
The court granted a preliminary injunction to protect users of medical marijuana in California
from seizure of their plants and prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act. Emphasizing
the intrastate nature of the appellants' use of marijuana, the court rejected the federal
government's arguments that interstate distribution of controlled substances could not be
distinguished from intrastate distribution.
Question Presented: Whether the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate possession and manufacture of marijuana for
purported personal "medicinal" use or to the distribution of marijuana without charge for such
use?
Angel McClary RAICH, et al., Appellants
V.
John ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as United States Attorney General, et al.,
Appellees
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided December 16, 2003
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Two of the appellants, Angel McClary
Raich and Diane Monson, are seriously ill
Californians who use marijuana for medical
purposes on the recommendation of their
doctors. Such use is legal under California's
Compassionate Use Act. Monson grows her
own medical marijuana. The remaining two
appellants, John Doe Number One and John
Doe Number Two, assist Raich in growing
her marijuana. On October 9, 2002, the
appellants filed suit against John Ashcroft,
the Attorney General of the United States,
and Asa Hutchinson, the Administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Administration,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
based on the alleged unconstitutionality of
the federal Controlled Substances Act. [...J
On March 5, 2003, the district court denied
the appellants' motion for a preliminary
injunction because the appellants had not
established a sufficient likelihood of success
on the merits. That ruling is now before us.
Factual and Procedural History
A. Statutory Scheme
391
1. The Controlled Substances Act
[The court reviewed the Controlled
Substances Act, which makes it unlawful to
knowingly or intentionally "manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance." Marijuana is
classified as a controlled substance, and the
CSA also addresses the difficulty of
determining whether a controlled substance
has been distributed or manufactured
intrastate or interstate, asserting that even
local, intrastate distribution and possession
of controlled substances contributes to
swelling the interstate traffic in such
substances.]
2. California's Compassionate Use Act of
1996
[The Court reviewed California's
Compassionate Use Act, which allows the
use of prescribed marijuana for the treatment
of certain illnesses and exempts patients and
caregivers from previously applicable
California code sections that make use or
possession illegal.]
B. Factual Background
Appellants Angel McClary Raich and Diane
Monson (the "patient-appellants") are
California citizens who currently use
marijuana as a medical treatment. Appellant
Raich has been diagnosed with more than
ten serious medical conditions, including an
inoperable brain tumor, life-threatening
weight loss, a seizure disorder, nausea, and
several chronic pain disorders. Appellant
Monson suffers from severe chronic back
pain and constant, painful muscle spasms.
Her doctor states that these symptoms are
caused by a degenerative disease of the
spine.
Raich has been using marijuana as a
medication for over five years, every two
waking hours of every day. Her doctor
contends that Raich has tried essentially all
other legal alternatives and all are either
ineffective or result in intolerable side
effects; her doctor has provided a list of
thirty-five medications that fall into the
latter category alone. Raich's doctor states
that foregoing marijuana treatment may be
fatal. Monson has been using marijuana as a
medication since 1999. Monson's doctor
also contends that alternative medications
have been tried and are either ineffective or
produce intolerable side effects. As the
district court put it: "Traditional medicine
has utterly failed these women
Appellant Monson cultivates her own
marijuana. Raich is unable to cultivate her
own. Instead, her two caregivers, appellants
John Doe Number One and John Doe
Number Two, grow it for her. These
caregivers provide Raich with her marijuana
free of charge. They have sued anonymously
in order to protect Raich's supply of medical
marijuana. In growing marijuana for Raich,
they allegedly use only soil, water, nutrients,
growing equipment, supplies and lumber
originating from or manufactured within
California. Although these caregivers
cultivate marijuana for Raich, she processes
some of the marijuana into cannabis oils,
balm, and foods.
On August 15, 2002, deputies from the
Butte County Sheriffs Department and
agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") came to Monson's home. The
sheriffs deputies concluded that Monson's
use of marijuana was legal under the
Compassionate Use Act. However, after a
three-hour standoff involving the Butte
County District Attorney and the United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of
392
California, the DEA agents seized and
destroyed Monson's six cannabis plants.
C. Procedural History
Fearing raids in the future and the prospect
of being deprived of medicinal marijuana,
the appellants sued the United States
Attorney General John Ashcroft and the
Administrator of the DEA Asa Hutchison on
October 9, 2002. Their suit seeks declaratory
relief and preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief. They seek a declaration
that the CSA is unconstitutional to the extent
it purports to prevent them from possessing,
obtaining, manufacturing, or providing
cannabis for medical use. The appellants
also seek a declaration that the doctrine of
medical necessity precludes enforcement of
the CSA to prevent Raich and Monson from
possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing
cannabis for their personal medical use.
On March 5, 2003, the district court denied
the appellants' motion for a preliminary
injunction. The district court found that,
"despite the gravity of plaintiffs' need for
medical cannabis, and despite the concrete
interest of California to provide it for
individuals like them," the appellants had
not established the required "'irreducible
minimum' of a likelihood of success on the
merits under the law of this Circuit .. .." The
appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on
March 12, 2003. We have jurisdiction to
hear this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1).
Analysis
1. Defining the Class of Activities
The district court found that the Commerce
Clause supports the application of the CSA
to the appellants. Indeed, we have upheld
the CSA in the face of past Commerce
Clause challenges. See United States v.
Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1479-80 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370,
375 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kim, 94
F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Montes-Zarate,
552 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d
1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972). But none of the
cases in which the Ninth Circuit has upheld
the CSA on Commerce Clause grounds
involved the use, possession, or cultivation
of marijuana for medical purposes.
[...] [H]ere the appellants are not only
claiming that their activities do not have the
same effect on interstate commerce as
activities in other cases where the CSA has
been upheld. Rather, they contend that,
whereas the earlier cases concerned drug
trafficking, the appellants' conduct
constitutes a separate and distinct class of
activities: the intrastate, noncommercial
cultivation and possession of cannabis for
personal medical purposes as recommended
by a patient's physician pursuant to
valid California state law.
Clearly, the way in which the activity or
class of activities is defined is critical. We
find that the appellants' class of activities -
the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation,
possession and use of marijuana for personal
medical purposes on the advice of a
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physician - is, in fact, different in kind from
drug trafficking. For instance, concern
regarding users' health and safety is
significantly different in the medicinal
marijuana context, where the use is pursuant
to a physician's recommendation. Further,
the limited medicinal use of marijuana as
recommended by a physician arguably does
not raise the same policy concerns regarding
the spread of drug abuse. Moreover, this
limited use is clearly distinct from the
broader illicit drug market - as well as any
broader commercial market for medicinal
marijuana - insofar as the medicinal
marijuana at issue in this case is not
intended for, nor does it enter, the stream of
commerce.
[The court analogized the instant case to its
recent decision in United States v. McCoy,
323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003), where it held
that a statute purportedly prohibiting the
possession of child pornography was
unconstitutional as applied to a mother's
intrastate possession of a photo of her and
her daughter with their genital areas
exposed. The photograph never did, nor was
ever intended to, reach the stream of
commerce.]
Under McCoy, the class of activities at issue
in this case can properly be defined as the
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation,
possession and use of marijuana for personal
medical purposes on the advice of a
physician and in accordance with state law.
This class of activities does not involve sale,
exchange, or distribution. As was the case in
McCoy, the class of activities here
represents a substantial portion of the
conduct covered by the statute - at the time
of the motion for a preliminary injunction,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington had passed laws permitting
cultivation and use of marijuana for medical
purposes. See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1132
("This class of activity represents a
substantial portion of the conduct covered
by [the statute].").
2. Substantial Effect on Interstate
Commerce
We must now answer the question whether
this class of activities has an effect on
interstate commerce sufficient to make it
subject to federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause. See Visman, 919 F.2d at
1392 ("In Perez .. . the Court ruled that the
defendants' local, illegal activity of loan
sharking was within a 'class of activity' that
adversely affected interstate commerce and
Congress had the power to regulate it."). In
two recent Commerce Clause decisions, the
Supreme Court has refined Commerce
Clause analysis. In Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 131
L. Ed. 2d 626, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the
Court struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 as an unconstitutional
exercise of power under the Commerce
Clause. Lopez set forth three categories of
activity that Congress may properly regulate
under the Commerce Clause: the "use of the
channels of interstate commerce"; the
"instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"; and "those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce."
514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted). This
case involves the third category of activity.
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
146 L. Ed. 2d 658, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000),
the Supreme Court clarified Commerce
Clause analysis under this third category. In
that case, the Court held that the Violence
Against Women Act was an invalid exercise
of federal power under the Commerce
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Clause. 529 U.S. at 627. Morrison
established a controlling four-factor test for
determining whether a regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce:
(1) whether t he statute regulates c ommerce
or any sort of economic enterprise; (2)
whether the statute contains any "express
jurisdictional element that might limit its
reach to a discrete set" of cases; (3) whether
the statute or its legislative history contains
''express congressional findings" regarding
the effects of the regulated activity upon
interstate commerce; and (4) whether the
link between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is
"attenuated." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12;
see also McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1119. The first
and the fourth factors are the most
important. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1119.
a. Whether the Statute Regulates
Commerce or Any Sort of Economic
Enterprise
As applied to the limited class of activities
presented by this case, the CSA does not
regulate commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise. The cultivation, possession, and
use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and
not for exchange or distribution is not
properly characterized as commercial or
economic activity. Lacking sale, exchange
or distribution, the activity does not possess
the essential elements of commerce. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.
1999) ("commerce": "The exchange of
goods and services, esp. on a large scale
involving transportation between cities,
states, and nations.").
On this point, the instant case is again
analogous to McCoy. The McCoy court
concluded "that simple intrastate possession
is not, by itself, either commercial or
economic in nature, that a 'home-grown'
picture of a child taken and maintained for
personal u se isn ot a fungible p roduct, and
that there is no economic connection -
supply and demand or otherwise - between
possession of such a picture and the national
multi-million dollar commercial
pornography industry." Id. at 1131.
As the photograph in McCoy stood in
contrast to the commercial nature of the
larger child pornography industry, so does
the medicinal marijuana use at issue in this
case stand in contrast to the larger illicit
drug trafficking industry. And it is the
commercial nature of drug trafficking
activities that has formed the basis of prior
Ninth C ircuit d ecisions upholding the C SA
on Commerce Clause grounds. See, e.g.,
Tisor, 96 F.3d at 375 ("Intrastate
distribution and sale of methamphetamine
are commercial activities. The challenged
laws are part of a wider regulatory scheme
cnminalizing interstate and intrastate
commerce in drugs." (emphasis added));
Kim, 94 F.3d at 1250 ("After Lopez, we
again acknowledged that drug trafficking
affects interstate commerce." (emphasis
added)).
The parties debate whether the
"aggregation principle" of Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 87 L. Ed. 122, 63 S.
Ct. 82 (1942), should be employed,
presumably to support a finding that the
cumulative effect of the activities in this
case has a commercial impact. As the
regulated activity in this case is not
commercial, Wickard's aggregation analysis
is not applicable. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611
n.4 ("In every case where we have sustained
federal regulation under the aggregation
principle in Wickard . . . the regulated
activity was of an apparent commercial
character."); McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1120 ("In
Lopez, the court approved of Wickard's
rationale only in relation to activity the
economic nature of which was obvious."
(citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558)); United
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States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1270
(8th Cir. 2002) ("No such aggregation of
local effects is constitutionally permissible
in reviewing congressional regulation of
intrastate, non-economic activity.").
The majority in McCoy went on to examine
whether the possession of child pornography
at issue in that case could fit within the
Wickard analysis, largely because a pre-
Morrison Third Circuit decision had done
just that. See 323 F.3d at 1121-22. The
parties pick up on this discussion and debate
whether, unlike the child pornography in
McCoy, the marijuana at issue here is
"fungible" such that the aggregation
principle should apply. This debate is
unnecessary in light of Supreme Court
precedent suggesting that the aggregation
principle should only be applied where the
activity's commercial character is apparent.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4. Here it is
not. Moreover, McCoy settled the fungibility
issue less by looking at whether the item
was one that could be freely exchanged or
replaced (what one might consider to be the
important characteristics of fungibility) and
more by simply concluding that the
photograph at issue in that case was "meant
entirely for personal use, without . . . any
intention of exchanging it for other items of
child pornography, or using it for any other
economic or commercial reasons. Nor is
there any reason to believe that [Rhonda
McCoy] had any interest in acquiring
pornographic depictions of other children."
323 F.3d at 1122. Under these standards, the
marijuana at issue in this case is similarly
non-fungible, as its use i s personal and the
appellants d o n ot s eck toe xchange it o r to
acquire marijuana from others in a market.
Therefore, we conclude that the first
Morrison factor favors a finding that the
CSA, as applied to the facts of this case, is
unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause.
b. Whether the Statute Contains Any
Express Jurisdictional Element That
Might Limit Its Reach
The second factor examines whether the
statute contains a "jurisdictional hook" (i.e.,
limitation) that would limit the reach of the
statute to a discrete set of cases that
substantially affect interstate commerce. See
McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124. No such
jurisdictional hook exists in relevant
portions of the CSA. See County of Santa
Cruz, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. Therefore,
this factor favors a finding that Congress has
exceeded its powers under the Commerce
Clause.
c. Whether the Statute or Its Legislative
History Contains Express Congressional
Findings Regarding the Effects of the
Regulated Activity Upon Interstate
Commerce
Congress clearly made certain findings in
the CSA regarding the effects of intrastate
activity on interstate commerce. These
findings do not specifically address the class
of activities at issue here. Relevant findings
include:
(4) Local distribution and possession of
controlled substances contribute to
swelling the interstate traffic in such
substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured
and distributed intrastate cannot be
differentiated from controlled substances
manufactured and distributed interstate.
Thus, is it not feasible to distinguish, in
terms of controls, between controlled
substances manufactured and distributed
interstate and controlled substances
manufactured and distributed intrastate.
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(6) Federal control of the intrastate
incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances is essential to the effective
control of the interstate incidents of such
traffic.
21 U.S.C. § 801. As noted above, supra
note 4, these findings are primarily
concerned with the trafficking or
distribution of controlled substances.
Nevertheless, they provide some evidence
that intrastate possession of controlled
substances may impact interstate commerce.
Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of
finding the CSA constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. But it is worth reiterating
two things in this respect. First, there is no
indication that Congress was considering
anything like the class of activities at issue
here when it made its findings. The findings
are not specific to marijuana, much less
intrastate medicinal use of marijuana that is
not bought or sold and the use of which is
based on the recommendation of a
physician. Common sense indicates that the
findings related to this specific class of
activities would be significantly different
from the findings relating to the effect of
drug trafficking, generally, on interstate
commerce.
Second, Morrison counsels courts to take
congressional findings with a grain of salt.
The existence of congressional findings
is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation. As we stated in Lopez,
simply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce does not
necessarily make it so. Rather, whether
particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently to come under the
constitutional power of Congress to
regulate them is ultimately a judicial
rather than a legislative question, and
can be settled finally only by this Court.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (citations and
quotation marks omitted). As noted above, it
is not the existence of congressional
findings, but rather the first and fourth
factors - whether the statute regulates
commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise and whether the link between the
regulated activity and a substantial effect on
interstate commerce is "attenuated" - that
are considered the most significant in this
analysis. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1119.
d. Whether the Link Between the
Regulated Activity and a Substantial
Effect on Interstate Commerce Is
"Attenuated"
The final Morrison factor examines whether
the link between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is
"attenuated." The connections in this case
are, indeed, attenuated. Presumably, the
intrastate cultivation, possession and use of
medical marijuana on the recommendation
of a physician could, at the margins, have an
effect on interstate commerce by reducing
the d emand for m arijuana that i st rafficked
interstate. It is far from clear that such an
effect would be substantial. The
congressional findings provide no guidance
in this respect, as they do not address the
activities at issue in the present case.
Although not binding, other judges that have
looked at the specific question presented
here have found that the connection is
attenuated. As o ne o f o ur c olleagues wrote
recently: "Medical marijuana, when grown
locally for personal consumption, does not
have any direct or obvious effect on
interstate commerce. Federal efforts to
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regulate it considerably blur the distinction
between what is national and what is local."
Conant v. Walters, 3 09 F.3d 6 29, 6 47 (9th
Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(citation omitted)). The district court in
County of Santa Cruz also seriously
questioned the strength of the link between
such activities and interstate commerce. See
County of Santa Cruz, 279 F. Supp. 2d at
1209 ("The fourth factor - whether the link
between [medical marijuana use] and a
substantial affect on interstate commerce is
attenuated - arguably favors Plaintiffs.").
Therefore, we conclude that this factor
favors a finding that the CSA cannot
constitutionally be applied to the class of
activities at issue in this case.
On the basis of our consideration of the four
factors, we find that the CSA, as applied to
the appellants, is likely unconstitutional. See
McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1124 ("It is particularly
important that in the field of criminal law
enforcement, where state power is
preeminent, national authority be limited to
those areas in which interstate commerce is
truly affected . . .. The police power is,
essentially, reserved to the states, Morrison,
529 U.S. at 618 . That principle must
guide our review of Congress's exercise of
Commerce Clause power in the criminal law
area."); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610
("[A] fair reading of Lopez shows that the
noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct
at issue was central to our decision in that
case.").
Therefore, we find that the appellants have
made a strong showing of the likelihood of
success on the merits of their case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse
the district court. We find that the appellants
have demonstrated a strong likelihood of
success on the merits. This conclusion,
coupled with public interest considerations
and the burden faced by the appellants if,
contrary to California law, they are denied
access to medicinal marijuana, warrants the
entry of a preliminary injunction. We
remand to the district court for entry of a
preliminary injunction consistent with this
opinion.
BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
It is simply impossible to distinguish the
relevant conduct surrounding the cultivation
and use of the marijuana crop at issue in this
case from the cultivation and use of the
wheat crop that affected interstate commerce
in Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63
S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). Accordingly,
I dissent.
[The dissent analogized the instant case to
Wickard, where an Ohio farmer was
convicted of growing additional wheat, in
violation of federal regulations aimed at
countering price fluctuations. Filburn, the
farmer, claimed that the wheat he had grown
was only to feed his family, and therefore
was not intended to, nor ever did, reach the
stream of interstate commerce. The Court
rejected Filburn's claim, asserting that his
contribution to the demand of wheat, taken
together with that of many others, has a
significant effect on interstate commerce.
The dissent argued that the plaintiffs'
conduct in the instant case is entirely
indistinguishable from that of Filburn's. The
plaintiffs' case passes the four-factor
Morrison test used by the court.]
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Is this particular activity economic or
non-economic, but necessarily regulated
as part of a larger regulatory scheme?
[The dissent argued that because the drugs
could be sold in interstate commerce, they
are o fan economic n ature. In addition, t he
cultivation of the plants for personal use
necessarily keeps plaintiffs from obtaining
marijuana from an outside source or seeking
a substitute such as the legally prescribed
drug Marinol. Even if the activity is non-
economic, the dissent finds that the
regulation is essential to the larger
commercial activity. The dissent points out
that medical marijuana could be grown and
destined for one of the states surrounding
California in which it is also permitted,
thereby traveling in interstate commerce,
even though permitted by state law.]
Were there adequate Congressional
findings?
[...] Congressional findings contained in 21
U.S.C. § 801(4) specifically state that,
"Local distribution and possession of
controlled substances contribute to swelling
the interstate traffic in such substances."
[ ... ]
What is the extent of the attenuation
between this conduct and interstate
commerce?
Finally, the court contends that circuit
precedent dictates that we recognize such a
degree of attenuation between the plaintiffs
conduct and interstate commerce that the
connection is effectively severed. I disagree.
I begin by acknowledging the dicta in the
concurring opinion in Conant v. Walters.
"Medical marijuana, when grown locally for
personal consumption, does not have any
direct or obvious effect on interstate
commerce." Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629, 647 (9 th Cir.2002) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, - U.S. , 124 S.
Ct. 387, 157 L.Ed.2d 276 (2003). On the
other hand, Congress contemplated
individual growers, possessors, and users
when it made its findings regarding the
CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 801(4). And, in light of
the growing interstate community of
medicinal marijuana users, the attenuation is
not great, even, perhaps, nonexistent.
Accordingly, an evaluation of any
attenuation factor favors the CSA's
constitutionality.
Plaintiffs, and the court, rely extensively on
this circuit's decision in United States v.
McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003), but
the case does not bear the weight the court
places on it. It is distinguishable in at least
one k ey r espect-marijuana i s a c ultivated,
fungible commodity that has objective and
readily transferable value in the
marketplace, as compared with the
noncommercial aspects of the home
photograph taken by Ms. McCoy for her
personal use. See id. at 1120. While it is
clear that plaintiffs do not propose to sell or
share their marijuana with others similarly
situated (or even no similarly situated), they
could. This is almost certainly not true of the
McCoy family photograph.
Three out of the four Morrison factors favor
regulation, and the conduct in this case is
indistinguishable from the conduct at issue
in Wickard v. Filburn. Accordingly, I
dissent.
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Medical Marijuana to Get Justices' Review
Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2004
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court announced Monday that
it would hear the Bush administration's
claim that federal drug agents have the
authority to arrest seriously ill C alifornians
who use homegrown marijuana to relieve
their pain.
The court agreed to hear an appeal filed by
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, who contends that
federal law prohibits the use of marijuana
"in all instances."
The case, to be heard in the fall, is a clash
between the strict federal drug laws and the
California initiative that allows patients to
use marijuana on the advice of their doctor.
It will also determine the fate of similar laws
in eight other states.
The case focuses not on whether using
marijuana makes medical sense, but whether
the federal authority extends to regulating a
plant that is grown at home.
The U.S. Constitution says Congress and the
federal government have the power to
regulate "commerce among the states." This
is the basis for most federal regulatory laws.
But defenders of the medical marijuana law
in California questioned how that federal
power can be extended to cover plants that
are grown by a patient for his or her own
use.
"It is a pretty far-fetched argument for them
to say this involves interstate commerce,
because there is no commerce and no
interstate activity," said Oakland attorney
Robert Raich, whose wife, Angel, is one of
two plaintiffs in the case.
The other, Diane Monson, suffers from a
degenerative disease of the spine. Like
Angel Raich, who has an inoperable brain
tumor, Monson said marijuana had been
especially effective at easing her pain and
restoring her appetite.
In August 2002, however, U.S. drug agents
raided Monson's home and destroyed her six
cannabis plants.
Late last year, the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the federal agents had
overstepped their authority and issued an
order that bars the Drug Enforcement
Administration from enforcing the drug laws
against patients whose marijuana is grown at
home.
The "noncommercial cultivation, possession
and use of marijuana for personal medical
purposes" is protected under California law
and is beyond the federal authority, said
Judge Harry Pregerson in a 2-1 decision. It
is "different in kind from drug trafficking,"
he added.
The Justice Department appealed that
decision, and on Monday the Supreme Court
said it would hear the case, Ashcroft vs.
Raich, during the court's next term.
"The Supreme Court has a chance to protect
the rights of patients everywhere who need
medical cannabis to treat their afflictions,"
said Steph Sherer, executive director of the
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medical-marijuana advocacy group
Americans for Safe Access. "Too many
have gone to prison, and too many have
been denied access to the medication their
doctors recommend."
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Court will hear medical pot appeal;
U.S. seeking to overturn state law upheld by appeals court
The San Francisco Chronicle
June 29, 2004
Bob Egelko, Patrick Hoge
The U.S. Supreme Court cast a cloud on the
medical marijuana movement's biggest legal
victory Monday when the justices agreed to
hear the Bush administration's appeal of a
ruling that protects marijuana patients in
California from federal prosecution.
The administration is challenging a decision
in December by the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals in San Francisco that barred
federal drug agents from interfering with the
growing and use of marijuana by two
women, Angel Raich of Oakland and Diane
Monson of Oroville (Butte County).
The court will hear the case in the term that
starts in October, with a ruling due by the
end of June 2005.
Medical marijuana advocates had hoped the
case would end without Supreme Court
review. The case may represent their last
chance to fend off the federal government's
attack on medical marijuana in California,
which followed passage of Proposition 215,
the 1996 initiative that legalized medical use
of the drug under state law.
The court that will decide the case has
consistently rejected challenges to federal
drug laws. Three years ago, the justices
overturned another Ninth Circuit decision
that would have allowed cannabis clubs to
distribute marijuana, without risking federal
prosecution, to patients who could show that
they needed it to prevent serious harm or
death and that legal drugs were ineffective
for them.
Attorneys for medical marijuana advocates
then pinned their hopes on the most
sympathetic plaintiffs available - individual,
seriously ill patients - and on a legal
argument that the Supreme Court has
favored in other contexts, the limits of
Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce.
Raich, 38, who uses marijuana with her
doctor's approval to treat pain, nausea and
seizures associated with a brain tumor and a
wasting syndrome, made a fervent plea at a
news conference Monday.
"Medical cannabis has saved my life," she
said, but "this case is not just about medical
cannabis. It's about whether or not the
federal government in this country has the
right to decide who may live and who may
die."
Raich, disabled since 1995, takes marijuana
about every two waking hours. Her primary
physician, Dr. Frank Lucido of Berkeley,
told reporters that Raich needs marijuana to
fight off her physical deterioration.
Monson takes marijuana to combat severe
back pain and muscle spasms. She also has a
doctor's recommendation for marijuana, as
required by Prop. 215.
Both women obtained their marijuana
locally and without charge - Raich from two
caregivers, Monson from her own garden, at
least until federal agents raided her property
in August 2002 and seized her six plants.
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Those raids were part of the Bush
administration's escalation of the federal
campaign against California's Prop. 215.
The C linton a dministration h ad also fought
Prop. 215, reacting to the 1996 measure by
moving to shut down clubs that had sprung
up around the state to supply marijuana to
patients, and by threatening to punish
doctors who recommended the drug.
Monson and Raich now have court orders
allowing them to continue using marijuana
as a result of December's appeals court
ruling.
The appeals panel ruled 2-1 that the women
were not engaged in interstate commerce, or
any kind of commercial activity, and that
prosecuting them under federal drug laws
would therefore be unconstitutional in a
state that has legalized the medical use of
marijuana.
"The medical marijuana at issue in this case
is not intended for, nor does it enter, the
stream of commerce," the court majority
said.
The ruling has already had an impact. A
federal judge in San Jose has used it to
prohibit further federal enforcement action
against a Santa Cruz medical marijuana
collective that was raided by federal agents
in 2002. Earlier this month, the appeals
court ordered judges to reconsider two other
cases in light of the Raich decision, one of
them an attempt by cannabis clubs in
Oakland, Ukiah and Fairfax to resume
supplying marijuana to patients.
But the Bush administration's Justice
Department argues that the Ninth Circuit has
once again failed to appreciate the power of
Congress to ban illegal drugs.
The appellate ruling "seriously undermines
Congress' comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of dangerous drugs," government
lawyers said in papers filed with the
Supreme Court.
The Justice Department c ited congressional
findings that all illicit drug traffic affects
interstate commerce because it increases the
demand for drugs, and because drugs sold
across state lines can't normally be traced to
their origin.
Under the appeals court ruling, government
lawyers said, those who want to distribute
any illegal drug for free within a state "could
function essentially as unregulated and
unsupervised drug manufacturers and
pharmacies." And, they added, by relying on
California's legalization of marijuana for
"purported medical purposes," the appeals
court ignored the fact that federal law
considers marijuana to be a dangerous drug
with no legitimate use.
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, H awaii, M aine,
Nevada, Oregon and W ashington s tate also
have medical marijuana laws, though federal
enforcement efforts have been largely
concentrated o n C alifornia. A 11 those states
except Colorado and Maine are in the Ninth
Circuit and thus were covered by
December's ruling.
Medical marijuana advocates put the best
face possible on the Supreme Court's
decision to review the case.
"The Supreme Court has a chance to protect
the right of patients everywhere who need
medical cannabis to treat their afflictions,"
said Steph Sherer, executive director of
Americans for Safe Access. [...]
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Justices Set Back Use of Marijuana to Treat Sickness
The New York Times
May 15, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled today that federal
law does not allow a "medical necessity"
exception to the prohibition on the
distribution of marijuana. The 8-to-0
decision dealt a setback, but not a definitive
blow, to a movement that has passed
medical marijuana ballot initiatives in eight
states.
The ruling did not overturn the state
initiatives or address any question of state
law. Rather, the court ruled that marijuana's
listing by Congress as a Schedule I drug
under the Controlled Substances Act meant
that it "has no currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States."
The court said in an opinion by Justice
Clarence Thomas that the federal appeals
court i n S an F rancisco misread federal 1 aw
when it ruled last year that an Oakland
marijuana cooperative could raise a medical-
necessity defense against the federal
government's effort to shut down the
pharmacylike cooperative.
The cooperative distributes marijuana to
patients whose doctors say they need it to
ease the symptoms of cancer, AIDS and
other illnesses.
The Justice Department brought the case as
a request for an inj unction rather than as a
criminal prosecution, which would have
required a jury trial. Since nearly three-
quarters of Oakland's voters supported
California's Proposition 215, the 1996
initiative that enacted the Compassionate
Use Act to permit the medical use of
marijuana, the government would have
faced - and, indeed, still faces - a daunting
challenge in finding a jury willing to convict
someone for making marijuana available for
that purpose.
The Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative
was set up with the blessing of the city
government and the police department.
The question before the Supreme Court
today was a relatively narrow one: not the
validity of the California initiative itself but
of the federal courts' response to the
government's request for an injunction. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ordered the trial judge, Charles
Breyer of Federal District Court, to tailor an
injunction that would permit those with a
serious medical condition that could be
alleviated only by marijuana to have
continued access to the drug.
The Clinton administration, asserting that
the Ninth Circuit had committed a serious
error that threatened to undermine federal
drug laws, persuaded the Supreme Court to
grant a stay of Judge Breyer's ruling last
August. [...]
Given the narrowness of the question before
the court, the decision today left a number of
questions unanswered. Among these were
the availability of a medical necessity
defense to i ndividual p atients w ho grow or
possess marijuana for their own use, as
opposed to a mass distributor like the
Oakland cooperative, as well as whether
state governments could carry out their
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medical marijuana initiatives by going
directly into the distribution business. Two
states, Nevada and Maine, are considering
such a system.
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Oregon and
Washington, in addition to California,
Nevada and Maine, have also passed
medical marijuana initiatives in the last few
years. [...]
Advocates oft he medical u se ofmarijuana
say the drug is effective in combatting the
nausea of chemotherapy and the wasting
syndrome of AIDS. The California Medical
Association, which supports the therapeutic
use of marijuana under a doctor's direction,
said today it was "very disappointed" in the
ruling because of the organization's "core
belief that patients should not suffer
unnecessarily when other options fail."
There is a debate over whether a legal drug
called Marinol, a synthetic version of the
active ingredient in marijuana, offers the
relief that some patients find in marijuana.
Kevin Zeese, president of Common Sense
for Drug Policy, an advocacy group here,
predicted that the decision would "heighten
the conflict in both legal and political terms"
and could make it difficult for prosecutors to
win a conviction in any marijuana case. Mr.
Zeese said the distribution clubs were
working on such new strategies as
maintaining a "grow room" where patients
would own their own marijuana plants, thus
avoiding the potential legal pitfall of
distribution.
Justice Thomas's opinion, United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, No.
00-151, contained some broad language
suggesting that its analysis meant there
could be no acceptable medical use of
marijuana in any setting, not only in the
context of distribution by large
organizations. For that reason, Justices John
Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg refused to sign his opinion,
writing in a separate concurring opinion that
large-scale distribution was the only issue
the case presented and on which the court
would validly rule.
"Most notably, whether the defense might
be available to a seriously ill patient for
whom there is no alternative means of
avoiding starvation or extraordinary
suffering is a difficult issue that is not
presented here," Justice Stevens wrote in an
opinion that the other two justices joined.
California filed a brief in support of the
Oakland cooperative, asserting that the
federal law "unduly intrudes into
California's traditional right to regulate for
the health and welfare of their citizens."
Justice Stevens said Justice Thomas's
opinion showed inadequate "respect for the
sovereign states that comprise our federal
union." This provoked a response from
Justice Thomas, who said: "Because federal
courts interpret, rather than author, the
federal criminal code, we are not at liberty
to rewrite it."
When he was governor of Texas, President
Bush said that he was personally opposed to
legalizing marijuana for medical use but that
states should have the right to decide for
themselves. "I believe each state can choose
that decision as they so choose," he said in
October 1999, according to an article in The
Dallas Morning News that Justice Stevens
cited in his opinion today.
405
Voters Approve Measure to Use Pot as Medicine
Los Angeles Times
November 6, 1996
John Balzar
After an upstart campaign that drew the
wrath of law enforcement, Californians
bucked years of d emonizing marijuana and
voted yes Tuesday to legalize use of the
drug for medical treatment.
Although Proposition 2 15 w as criticized as
the wrong message during America's war
against drugs, and full of loopholes to boot,
a majority of voters saw it differently in this
big surprise.
"Doonesbury won the election!" joked
Loyola law professor Laurie Levenson, a
former federal prosecutor. "This may be the
baby boomers taking control."
She referred to one of the campaign's
sideshows, in which cartoonist Garry
Trudeau publicized the initiative in his
"Doonesbury" comic strip and made fun of
state Atty. Gen. Dan Lungren's hard-line
stand against medical use of marijuana. At
the time, Lungren indignantly responded
that the cartoon was trivializing the dire
social consequences of drug abuse.
On Tuesday, Lungren sounded slightly
flummoxed about the election outcome.
"This thing is a disaster. What's going to
happen? We're going to have an
unprecedented mess," he said.
In another blow to the anti-drug
establishment, voters in neighboring
Arizona passed an even broader measure. In
that state, Proposition 200 legalizes
medicinal use of marijuana as well as other
drugs now beyond the reach of doctors. But
of more consequence, it specifies that
nonviolent drug users convicted of first- and
second-time use of recreational drugs be
given probation and rehabilitation instead of
prison time.
As for California's vote, its symbolism is
sure to be debated for days just what
message are voters sending? Supporters
said it should not be interpreted as a vote for
drug use, but a vote against government's
anti-drug hysteria. And they vowed to
spread their campaign to other states and
Congress.
Dave Fratello, spokesman for the
Proposition 215 committee, Californians for
Medical Rights, said that vote would have
only limited effects.
"What we are going to find in California
very quickly is that the sky is not going to
fall. There is not going to be a wave of new
marijuana use prompted by 215," he said.
Fratello announced that his organization
would establish a toll-free hotline
Wednesday to counsel doctors and their
patients about the initiative.
Gov. Pete Wilson said voters were
attempting to be "compassionate" with their
vote to help seriously ill patients, such as
those with AIDS, alleviate pain. But he said
Proposition 215 was poorly worded and
would have broader effects.
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"They didn't pay attention to the details,"
Wilson said of voters. "It is so loose it is a
virtual legalization of the sale of marijuana."
In an exit survey of voters statewide, the Los
Angeles Times Poll found that not only was
Proposition 215 favored by what appeared to
be a convincing majority, but also that it was
favored by one-third of Republicans and by
about 25% of those who described
themselves as conservative. As might be
expected, there was a generation gap, with
voters over 65 opposed to the measure but a
majority of other voters appearing to support
it.
The practical effect of the vote, however,
seems surely to be mired in legal doubt.
Federal law classifies marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, a category reserved for the
most dangerous of substances that "lack an
accepted medical use." By comparison,
opium and cocaine are classified as
Schedule II drugs and can be prescribed
under supervision of the state medical board.
California's vote does nothing to alter that,
and President Clinton's drug czar, Barry
McCaffrey, has been highly critical of the
California and Arizona propositions.
Tuesday night, the former Army general's
spokesman, Donald P. Marple, sounded a
cautious note, however.
"We'll save our reaction until we've seen
the size of the vote," Marple said.
In a pre-election television interview,
McCaffrey had been quoted as saying that
the federal government would prosecute
doctors who attempted to prescribe
marijuana.
But Marple offered a clarification: "What
Gen. McCaffrey has said is that the federal
government will uphold the law, but that
you've got to look at any situation on a case-
by-case basis."
"What does it mean in practice? We'll have
to see how they put this into effect first,"
Marple said.
The wording of the ballot proposition poses
uncertainties. It calls for lifting drug
penalties for doctors who "recommend"
marijuana for treatment, and for patients
who follow the recommendation and use it.
Growing marijuana for medical purposes is
legal under the proposition, but its sale is
not.
Levenson said she doubted if there would be
a substantial number of prosecutions.
"I think it's unlikely the federal government
would take resources away from the
prosecution of heroin and crack cocaine
cases to go after marijuana cases. They
might do a few cases to set an example. You
have to remember that marijuana cases have
not been a priority for the federal
government lately, unless it was a boatload
or a planeload of marijuana."
She also said that there is a very practical
consideration that prosecutors will have to
take into consideration. "You have to try
your case to a jury that comes from this
electorate. If t his m any people support t his
measure, what are your chances of
winning?"
Peter Arenella, a criminal law professor at
UCLA, said medical patients who use the
drug could still risk legal trouble.
"Technically, federal prosecutors retain the
power to prosecute some sick individual
who is using marijuana to alleviate his
discomfort," he said.
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But he added, "Practically, it would make
very little sense tou se scarce p rosecutorial
resources on such a case after the passage of
this initiative in California. The only
purpose for such a prosecution would be to
remind Californians that federal law has the
last word."
Orange County Sheriff Brad Gates, who
chaired the anti-Proposition 215 campaign,
said the vote poses "very serious legal
problems for the enforcement of drugs."
He said he planned to convene a high-level
meeting of federal and state law
enforcement officials "to determine what
course of action we will be taking in the
next several weeks."
Gates and other opponents were sharply
critical of the fact that most of the $ 2
million that supporters raised w as from s ix
individuals, five of whom live out of state.
Among them is New York philanthropist
George Soros, who gave $ 550,000 to the
Proposition 215 campaign and $ 430,000 to
the ballot measure in Arizona.
Gates said the outcome proved that a few
"rich people who want to spend their money
affecting the social climate and environment
of Californians and Arizonans . . . can move
to legalize drugs throughout the country."
That said, however, sufferers from AIDS
and cancer were among those most strongly
seeking Proposition 215-the first statewide
vote on marijuana since 1972. Back then,
voters soundly rejected legalization of the
drug. Last year and also in 1994, the
Legislature passed its own versions of
Proposition 215 on medical marijuana, but
Wilson vetoed them.
In this campaign, medical researchers
argued that America's war on drugs had
reached such an extreme that even
legitimate, supervised research had been
closed off
"The public is ahead of the politicians," said
Bill Zimmerman, the Los Angeles political
consultant who ran the Proposition 215
campaign.
"People know that the drug warriors are
lying about marijuana by lumping it in with
heroin and cocaine. There is too much direct
experience with marijuana for that to be
credible."
Celebrating his victory with 50 boisterous
supporters at a downtown Los Angeles
hotel, Zimmerman said, "For us, this
campaign does not end tonight. There are 49
other states."
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Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
(03-388)
Ruling Below: (Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 5th Cir., 332 F.3d 323)
The court held that the state law claims of 29 Texas peanut farmers against herbicide
manufacturer Dow for breach of warranty, fraud, failure to warn, and violation of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act were all preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
Question Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts state law claims concerning labeling
requirements for an herbicide?
Dennis BATES, et al., Appellants
V.
DOW AGROSCIENCES, LLC, Appellee
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided June 11, 2003
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
FELDMAN, District Judge:
Dow Agrosciences LLC sought a
declaratory judgment against 29 Texas
peanut farmers whom were threatening to
sue Dow for damages caused by a Dow-
manufactured herbicide. Dow sought,
among other things, a judicial declaration
that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136
(West 2002), preempts the farmers' state
law claims. The district court denied the
farmers' motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and granted Dow's motion for
summary judgment, holding that FIFRA
preempts the farmers' state law claims. We
affirm.
Strongarm is a herbicide produced and
marketed by Dow to control the growth of
weeds in peanuts. Strongarm is registered
with the United States Environmental
Protection Agency as required by FIFRA.
In the spring of 2000, many peanut farmers
from west and northwest Texas bought
Strongarm from local retailers. Many of
these farmers contend that Strongarm
stunted the growth of peanut plants, caused
yellowing, inhibited peanuts from lapping or
properly developing foliage, delayed
maturity, reduced total peanut production,
and increased the expense of harvesting
future peanut crops.
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The farmers sent Dow demand letters,
claiming that Dow retailers had
misrepresented Strongarm. The letters
threatened to sue Dow for false advertising,
breach of warranty, and fraudulent trade
practices under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA). See Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code Ann. § 17.505(a) (Vernon
2002).
[The farmers contend that the retailers failed
to disclose that Strongarm damages peanut
crops planted in soil with a pH level above
7.0]
Dow struck first, and sued for declaratory
judgment against 29 of the farmers. Dow
sought a declaration that: [...] FIFRA
preempts the farmers' state law claims [...].
The farmers counter-claimed against Dow
for negligence, breach of implied and
express warranties, fraud, fraud in the
inducement, defective design, estoppel, and
waiver.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[The court addressed the claim of the
farmers that federal diversity jurisdiction did
not exist over their lawsuit because three of
the farmers' claims failed the meet the
$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.
The court held that the availability of treble
damages and the inclusion of attorney's fees
would allow all claims to satisfy the
requirement.]
B. Abstention
[The court addressed the farmers' claim that
the district court should have abstained from
taking jurisdiction, because Dow's lawsuit
was filed in anticipation of a lawsuit by the
farmers and was done in large part in order
to select a favorable forum (in this case,
federal court). The court rejected this claim,
finding Dow's actions permissible under St.
Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585 (5th
Cir.1994).]
C. FIFRA Preemption
Appellants also contend that the district
court erred when it decided, by way of
summary judgment, that FIFRA preempted
their state law claims. Our review of a
district court's grant of summary judgment
is de novo. See Young v. Equifax Credit
Information Services, Inc., 294 F.3d 631,
635 (5th Cir. 2002).
Preemption analysis proceeds from "the
assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
605, 115 L. Ed. 2d 532, 111 S. Ct. 2476
(1991). Preemption may nonetheless occur
in one of three ways: it may be expressed by
the federal statute, it may be implied from
the terms or structure of a federal statute, or
it may arise in a situation w here a conflict
between state and federal regulations makes
compliance with both a physical
impossibility. See id. The district court
found that FIFRA expressly preempted the
farmers' state law claims. We agree.
FIFRA is a comprehensive regulatory
scheme aimed at controlling the use, sale,
and labeling of pesticides. See id. at 601.
FIFRA requires, among other things, that
manufacturers submit proposed product
labels for EPA approval. See 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(1)(C) (West 2002).
Section 136v of FIFRA announces:
(a) In General
A State may regulate the sale or use of any
federally registered pesticide or device in the
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State, but only if and to the extent the
regulation does not permit any sale or use
prohibited by this subchapter.
(b) Uniformity
Such State shall not impose or continue in
effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from
those required under this subchapter.
The Court has addressed the scope of §
136v(b) many times. See Hart v. Bayer
Corp., 199 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2000); Andrus
v. Agrevo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395 (5th Cir.
1999); MacDonald v. Monsanto, 27 F.3d
1021 (5th Cir. 1994). Our decisions reveal
three clear principles. First, FIFRA does not
completely preempt all state or local
regulation of pesticides. See Hart, 199 F.3d
at 244 (rejecting an attempt to premise
federal question jurisdiction on a claim of
complete preemption). Second, FIFRA does
not preempt common law that is
unconcerned with herbicide labeling, nor
does it preempt those state laws concerned
with herbicide labeling that do not impose
any requirement in addition to or different
from t he F IFRA requirements. See A ndrus,
178 F.3d at 398; see also Hart, 199 F.3d at
245 ("FIFRA preemption does not extend to
non-labeling state common-law causes of
action."). Finally, FIFRA preempts state
laws that either directly or indirectly impose
different labeling requirements. See
MacDonald, 27 F.3d at 1025.
The district court found that each of the
farmers' state claims were preempted under
§ 136v(b) because they constituted
"requirements for labeling and packaging in
addition to those required under" FIFRA.
Appellants advance two arguments against
preemption. First, they contend that state
labeling requirements related to product
effectiveness are not within the scope of
FIFRA's express preemption clause.
Second, they assert that their claims are not
sufficiently related to the content of the
Strongarm label. We reject each argument.
1) State Labeling Requirements Related
to Product Effectiveness are Within Scope
of FIFRA's Express Preemption Clause
Appellants urge that their product
effectiveness claims, even those which
impose a labeling requirement, are not
within the scope of FIFRA's express
preemption clause. Their argument suggests
that FIFRA preemption of performance-
related claims requires the existence of
conflicting EPA enactments.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that, as long as a federal
statute contains an express preemption
clause, it is wholly unnecessary and
inappropriate to import notions of implied
preemption through conflict into the express
preemption analysis. 505 U.S. 504, 517,
531-32, 544, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407, 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992)(plurality opinion). Nowhere in
FIFRA's text is § 136v(b)'s express
preemptive command, or § 136v(a)'s
savings clause, linked to the interplay of
EPA regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (West
2002); see also Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981
F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993)("We believe
Congress circumscribed the area of labeling
and packaging and preserved it only for
federal law ... with the same stroke,
Congress banned any form of state
regulation, and the interdiction law is c lear
and irrefutable.")(emphasis added).
Although FIFRA's text does not define the
scope of FIFRA's preemption clause to be a
function of existing EPA regulations,
appellants nonetheless insist that an implied
conflict preemption analysis must be
imported into § 136v(b). To support their
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claim, they rely primarily on the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in American
Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, which held that the
EPA's decision to not regulate product
labeling "with respect to how well a product
works" meant that "state common-law
claims about target area crop damage are not
preempted." 79 S.W.3d 21, 23, 45 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 761 (Tex. 2002). The Texas high
court reasoned, "EPA regulations define the
domain expressly preempted" by FIFRA
because Congress gave the EPA the "role of
evaluating and determining the content of
pesticide labels." Id. at 24 (citing 7 U.S.C
136w(a)(1) (West 2002))(internal quotation
omitted).
We find Geye unhelpful because it did not
address the principal issue: whether the
scope of FIFRA's express preemption clause
includes product effectiveness claims which
relate to product labeling. Geye holds only
that the specific Texas st ate-law claims for
crop damage did not present a problem of
conflict preemption under the applicable
EPA regulations. In other words, Geye
proceeds from the assumption that the
claims at issue did not relate to product
labeling and that FIFRA's express
preemption clause did not apply.
The scope of FIFRA's express preemption
clause is defined by the simple text of §
136v. That the EPA has not elected to
impose labeling regulations concerning
product effectiveness does not alter the plain
meaning of § 136v(b) nor avoid preemption
of a claim that has the effect of imposing
labeling requirements. For a state to create a
labeling requirement by authorizing a claim
linked to the specifications of a label, even
where the EPA has elected not to impose
such labeling requirements, would clearly be
to impose a requirement "in addition to or
different from those" required under FIFRA.
See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). Thus, the farmers'
claims, including those which challenge
Strongarm's effectiveness, are within the
scope of FIFRA's express preemption clause
if they are related to the content of the
Strongarm label.
2) The Farmers' Claims are Sufficiently
Related to the Content of Strongarm
Label
The farmers argue that their claims are not
related to the Strongarm label. This
argument betrays the facts and it betrays
common sense. We have observed that
FIFRA's express preemption clause is self-
executing. Thus, the farmers' claims are
expressly preempted under § 136v(b) if a
judgment against Dow would induce it to
alter its product label. See Andrus, 178 F.3d
395, 399 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that state
law claims that herbicide had "failed to
perform as specified pursuant to the label"
were preempted by FIFRA because the
plaintiffs success on such claims would
necessarily have had the effect of "imposing
additional labeling standards").
The facts aside for one moment, a claim's
relatedness to a product label may be
determined simply by reference to the
party's pleadings. See id., at 399. Unlike
Andrus, where the plaintiffs complaint
specifically referenced "specifications set
forth in the label," the farmers' counterclaim
simply asserts in general that the label did
not include a valid disclaimer or limitation
of remedies. We, therefore, look at each of
the farmers' state claims to determine
whether a judgment against Dow would
cause it to need to alter the Strongarm label.
See MacDonald, 27 F.3d at 1024 ("Courts
must compare the particular language of a
statute's preemption provision with each
common law claim asserted to determine
whether the common law claim is in
fact preempted.").
412
a) Breach of Warranty, Fraud and DTPA
The farmers base their breach of warranty,
fraud, and DTPA claims on misleading
comments made by Dow retailers. Claims
for breach of warranty based upon an "off
label" representation are preempted by
FIFRA only if the representation deviates
from t he contents o ft he product I abel. See
Andrus, 178 F.3d at 399. Success on such an
"off label" claim would provide a
manufacturer with a strong incentive to alter
its label to avoid future liability. See id.
The district court found that the farmers
failed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact that the Dow retailers'
comments differed or strayed in any material
manner from the contents of the Strongarm
label. After reviewing the record, we agree
with the district court. Thus, the farmers'
warranty claims are preempted under §
136v(b). See id. at 400 (refusing to overturn
a grant of summary judgment on a defense
of preemption where the plaintiffs failed to
establish that the representations forming the
basis of the claim differed from the contents
of the FIFRA label).
The farmers' fraud claims, based upon the
same "off label" statements by Dow
representatives, are subject to an identical
analysis. Because no evidence was presented
demonstrating that the retailer statements
deviated from the contents of the Strongarm
label, the fraud claims are similarly
preempted by § 136v(b).
The DTPA does not create a warranty;
rather, it establishes a remedy for the breach
of an independent warranty. See Centex
Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 269, 46
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 294 (Tex. 2002). Because
the only warranty at issue is based upon
these "off-label" comments, the farmers'
success on a DTPA action would also
induce Dow to alter its label. The DTPA
claim is thus necessarily preempted by
FIFRA § 136v(b).
b) Defective Design
Defectively manufactured or designed
products properly labeled under FIFRA are
generally subject to state regulation. See
Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895,
899 (8th Cir. 2002). Dow, however,
correctly contends that the farmers'
defective design claim is merely a disguised
claim for failure to warn. See Grenier v.
Vermont Log Buildings, Inc., 96 F.3d 559,
564 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Merely to call
something a design or manufacturing defect
claim does not automatically avoid FIFRA's
explicit preemption clause."). One cannot
escape the heart of the farmers' grievance:
Strongarm is dangerous to peanut crops in
soil with a pH level over 7.0, and that was
not disclosed to them.
In Netland, the Eighth Circuit evaluated a
FIFRA preemption defense to a strict
liability claim. See Netland, 284 F.3d at 899.
The Netland court found that the plaintiffs
expert testimony was insufficient to
establish a design defect, and that the claim
was obviously more directed to deficiencies
in the EPA-approved label. See id. at 900-
01.
Netland is a good guide for us. The farmers'
counterclaim presents a straightforward
design defect claim, that Strongarm was
unreasonably dangerous at the time it left
Dow's control. Nonetheless, the farmers did
not claim that Strongarm is unreasonably
dangerous for use on all peanut crops;
rather, they asserted that Strongarrn is
dangerous when applied to crops in soil with
high pH levels. See Grenier, 96 F.3d at 565
(finding plaintiffs claim that a product was
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defectively designed because it was negligence are all preempted by FIFRA's
foreseeable that it would be used in a express preemption clause because success
particular way "is effectively no more than on such claims would necessarily induce
an attack on the failure to warn against [that] Dow to alter its product label. AFFIRMED.
use and therefore is a preempted claim").
We find that the farmers' strict liability
counterclaim is functionally a disguised
claim for failure to warn. It is inescapable
that success on this claim would again
necessarily induce Dow to alter the
Strongarm label. The district court did not
err in ruling that FIFRA expressly preempts
the farmers' defective design claim.
c) Negligence
The farmers also maintain that Dow was
negligent in the testing, manufacture, and
production of Strongarm. They overlook that
a negligent testing claim is, as a matter of
Texas law, a variation of an action for
failure to warn. See American Tobacco Co.
v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 437, 40 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 658 (Tex. 1997). We agree with
the district court that the farmers' negligent
manufacture claim was, again, simply a
disguised claim for failure to warn and is
preempted by § 136v(b).
Each of the farmers' claims exceeded the
$75,000 statutory requirement for federal
diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, the district
court conducted a proper Trejo abstention
analysis. Given that the balance of the Trejo
factors does not appear to point clearly
toward abstention, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by
entertaining the declaratory judgment action.
We reiterate that, because F IFRA's e xpress
preemption clause is self-executing, FIFRA
preemption of performance-related state law
claims i s not dependent upon the existence
of conflicting EPA regulations. Moreover,
the farmers' claims for breach of warranty,
fraud, DTPA, defective design and
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Supreme Court to consider FIFRA tort preemption
Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News
July 5, 2004
Maureen Conley
The U.S. Supreme Court June 28 agreed to
review a lower court decision on FIFRA tort
preemption, which attorneys familiar with
the case say represents the first time the
nation's highest court will weigh in on the
matter.
At issue is a 2002 decision from the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences, which upheld the principle
that section 136v(b) of FIFRA preempts any
damages claims stemming from allegations
regarding the adequacy or accuracy of the
information on an EPA-approved pesticide
label. Lawrence Ebner, an industry lawyer
who has worked on FIFRA preemption
cases for 30 years, says all nine federal
appeals courts "have held that the section
expressly exempts any and all 'failure to
warn' claims against pesticide
manufacturers and distributors." The
Supreme Court has declined several times to
review appeals of those decisions.
This time, the court agreed to undertake a
review at the request o fp laintiffs and over
the objections of the U.S. Solicitor General.
Ebner told Pesticide & Toxic Chemical
News there was no reason for the Supreme
Court to take a FIFRA tort preemption case
before, "in light of the vast, overwhelming
body of federal and state case law
establishing" the preemption principle.
The case now pending before the court
presents a narrower question of whether
failure-to-warn claims involving agricultural
crop damage are excluded from FIFRA tort
preemption on grounds that EPA has
discretion in whether it reviews efficacy or
phytotoxicity information before approving
a pesticide's label.
The only decision to hold that such claims
are excluded came from the Texas Supreme
Court, which ruled in favor of plaintiffs in
American Cyanimide v. Geye. EPA has
discretion to demand data on efficacy or
phytotoxicity, and the Texas court held that
manufacturers cannot stand behind FIFRA if
EPA does not require them to produce that
data as a prerequisite for obtaining
registration. Ebner, an attorney with the law
firm McKenna, Long & Aldridge, argued
the case on behalf of American Cyanamide.
In 2003, the Supreme Court declined to
review that case on procedural grounds.
The case now before the Supreme Court
began after the 2000 growing season. Peanut
farmers faced peculiarly harsh climatic
conditions, according to Dow attorney Guy
Ralford. When Dow became aware they had
concerns that Dow's Strongarm herbicide
may have contributed to their crop losses,
the company entered a voluntary mediation
program.
"We did everything we could to compensate
farmers who thought they were affected" by
the product, he told Pesticide & Toxic
Chemical News, adding that the company
reached settlement agreements with every
farmer who participated in the program.
While the sum paid out is confidential,
Ralford s aid s ettlements w ere reached w ith
about 100 farmers in Texas and Oklahoma.
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But some 80 farmers declined to participate
in the mediation program and instead told
Dow they planned to sue. Dow then filed
two motions for declaratory judgment in
federal district courts in Oklahoma City and
Lubbock, Tex., Ralford said, asking the
courts to declare Dow had no liability. Dow
won summary judgment in both cases in
2002 based on FIFRA preemption.
Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which upheld
the lower court decisions. Plaintiffs then
filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The high court's review offers an
opportunity to resolve some ambiguities that
have arisen in the case law in recent years,
Ralford said. In addition to the Texas
Supreme Court case, the Montana Supreme
Court created an "outlier" when it relied on
a now-repudiated amicus brief filed in
California by the federal government during
the Clinton administration. That brief, filed
in Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, argued
FIFRA's preemption clause does not
encompass tort claims.
While the California Supreme Court rejected
the argument, the Montana Court relied
upon it in a suit against Dow that was
decided several years ago. That decision was
the only one in years that did not uphold
FIFRA preemption, so Ralford said Dow is
hopeful the Supreme Court will clarify the
ambiguity when it rules on Bates v. Dow.
Ralford said the court has discretion to make
its ruling as broad or as narrow as the
justices would like. He said he will argue
that "Congress stated very clearly in section
136(v)(b) of FIFRA that states may not
impose requirements on pesticide labeling or
packaging beyond those contained in
FIFRA." Case law supports the idea that
state law-based tort litigation attacking the
adequacy of a pesticide label constitutes a
requirement prohibited under FIFRA, he
said. As far as carving out an exception, he
said, "FIFRA says what is says, it is not
selective as to what kinds of claims are
prohibited."
Attorneys for the plaintiffs did not return
several phone calls seeking comment.
Plaintiffs opening briefs are due 45 days
from the June 28 court order. Dow's reply
brief will be due 30 days after that. The
court could issue a decision by the end of
the year.
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The Supreme Court Term That Was and the One That Will Be
AEI Online
July 1, 2002
Michael S. Greve
Federalism's Frontier
The Supreme Court's federalism, like Gaul,
falls into three parts. One set of cases and
doctrines revolves around "moral
federalism"-that is, the authority of state
and local governments to regiment or, as the
case may be, improve their citizens' social
mores. A second set of cases governs the
national entitlement state. The central
question in this arena is the extent to which
the private beneficiaries of the welfare state
may sue in court to enforce federal rights,
mandates, and policies against the states. A
third set of cases and doctrines deals with
the regulatory state-that is, the authority of
the states and the national government,
respectively, to muck around in the
economy. [ ... ] The judicial record on
regulatory programs and competencies is not
[...] heartening. The profederalist justices
recognize that more "states' rights" in this
area might turn federalism, and the
economy, into a playpen for trial lawyers,
ambitious state attorneys general, and
parochial state legislatures. The place where
the spirit of federalism meets the fear of
balkanization is federal preemption-that is,
the question of when and to what extent
federal law trumps contravening state law.
Preemption will prove the central federalism
question during the coming term-and
beyond.
Commerce?
Unlike entitlements and mandates, where
federalism unmistakably points in one
direction, regulatory issues implicate two
problems that appear to require different
solutions-one federalist, the other
nationalist. The first problem is federal
meddling in corners of the economy that
should, as a matter of constitutional
principle and public policy, be left to the
states. That problem calls for
decentralization and federalism. The second
problem is the states' tendency to bury the
economy under a flood of conflicting
regulations. That tendency can be arrested
only by a central authority, usually
Congress. Parochialism calls for federal
preemption and for judicial doctrines that
facilitate preemption-a distinctly nationalist
solution, at least at first sight.
On the question of federal overreach, the
division on the Court is clear. The Fab Four
believe that no such thing exists, at least not
in a judicially recognizable form. The
Federalist Five hold that federal meddling
ought to stop at the water's edge of
economic regulation: a federal regulation
that is "economic" in character is ipso facto
constitutional, whereas "noneconomic"
conduct is beyond the scope of the
commerce clause. This line was established
in United States v. Lopez (1995) and United
States v. Morrison (2000), and the Court has
shown no inclination to revisit it. The central
commercial federalism question, then,
comes down to the federal (constitutional or
statutory) preemption of state regulation.
The F ab Four w ant no c onstitutional limits
on Congress's regulatory authority and no
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judicial rule that would facilitate
congressional preemption. Federalism, on
their t heory, works b est when g overnments
at all levels operate without constraint.
Individual justices will occasionally defect
from this regulation-maximizing rule.
Justice Breyer may permit preemption upon
a showing that the federal regulators are, or
acted as if they were, as smart as he is;
Justice Stevens turns aggressively
preemptive when he himself, rather than
some mere legislator or bureaucrat, does the
preempting. Still, the regulation-maximizing
default rule is clear. The Federalist Five, in
contrast, are torn between their states'-rights
impulse and the recognition that a collection
of fifty regulatory fiefdoms-the natural
result of a narrow preemption doctrine-
cannot really be the face of modem
federalism nor, for that matter, what the
Founders had in mind.
The Stakes
Three considerations render preemption, and
in particular the federal preemption of state
tort law, the most serious federalism issue
on the horizon. First, plaintiffs' lawyers and
state attorneys general constitute a serious
threat to a functioning economy-more
serious than state legislatures and far more
serious than creative accountants. (The
exploits of the attorneys general and the trial
lawyers are technically legal.) Second, the
Supreme Court's doctrines on the federal
preemption of state law, including and
especially tort law, are confused and
incoherent. (No lawyer, judge, or legal
scholar would contest the point.) Third, the
doctrines-such as they are-are on a collision
course with the rest of the Supreme Court's
federalism, in spirit and in point of doctrine.
Sooner or later, something will have to give,
and preemption will be it.
Extant preemption law, for example,
encompasses something called "implied
preemption," meaning that the intent to
preempt need not be stated explicitly. [... ]
We know, however, on the excellent
authority of a slew of precedents, that
Congress may not impose regulatory
obligations under federal entitlement statutes
unless those obligations are clearly stated in
the law. The obligations may not be implied.
Why then should Congress or federal
agencies be allowed to preempt state
regulation without a comparably clear
statement?
The Supreme C ourt h as n ever articulated a
clear answer to that question. Waffling and
indecision at this front, though, will
eventually havc fateful consequences. Were
the Court's "clear statement" rule, as applied
in entitlement cases, to spill over into
preemption, almost no federal statute would
preempt much of anything at all. That result
will obtain whenever one or more of the
Federalist Five conclude that state
impositions on interstate commerce are the
price we must pay for "states' rights" and,
on those grounds, defect to the four
regulation maximizers. [...]
Averting that threat will ultimately require a
set of preemption-related constitutional and
interpretive doctrines that are consistent
with the Supreme Court's federalism,
without laying waste to interstate commerce
in the process. In going about that daunting
enterprise, the justices would greatly benefit
from outside assistance-specifically, parties
and lawyers who present the right cases and
the right arguments with consistency and
force. Unfortunately, help may not be
forthcoming.
Helpless
The importance of supply-side guidance is
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illustrated by the Court's coherent and
principled entitlement jurisprudence. Among
the reasons for that salutary development is
the fact that those cases have a ready-made
constituency-the states and in particular
state attorneys general. The attorneys
general are repeat players in case after case,
and they coordinate their litigation activities
(for example, through the National
Association of Attorneys General). So the
cases keep coming, and they tend to reach
the Court in roughly the right order-one
incremental step after another toward the
well-defined federalism objective of state
immunity against private lawsuits.
Preemption litigation presents an entirely
different picture. Here, too, the states are
repeat players. But they (and their trial
lawyer clientele) will insist on their
parochial advantages. Balkanization suits
them just fine, and they will actively resist
any move toward legal doctrines that
forestall that result. Corporations, for their
part, rarely look beyond the immediate case
at hand and are in any event compelled to
argue within the confines of the extant,
confused law. To expect coordination and
strategic sense from that quarter i s to hope
against evidence and logic.
The one institution that could provide
guidance and a broader view is the U.S.
Department of Justice-specifically, the
Office of the Solicitor General. The solicitor
general participates in every preemption
case, and since those cases turn on the
interpretation of federal statutes, his views
are accorded special weight. Lo, the Bush
administration has taken a somewhat
consistent stand on federalism issues.
Unfortunately, though, it is a shade to the
left of Justice Souter.
While the administration will occasionally
get a case right (for example, when the feds'
own money, rather than the states' or
corporate America's, is on the table), the
administration has on the whole adopted
litigation positions that promote
nationalization and regulatory balkanization
at the same time. [...] [A] possible
explanation can be found-outside the
solicitor general's office, in White House
policy.
To wage war against terrorism, the
administration believes that it must avoid
undue strife and challenges at the domestic
front. That often means pacifying noisy
constituencies, especially those that might
swing closely contested states and districts.
That is how we got an education "reform"
written by Senator Edward Kennedy and the
National Education Association, a farm bill
of European proportions, and a steel tariff.
Like John Wayne, the administration
protects its back by sitting up against the
wall-except it never shoots the evildoers
who barge in through the barroom door. It
buys them a drink.
[...] The path of least resistance is to let the
rapacious interests run riot in the states. The
solicitor general is just the guy to perform
that maneuver-because he can and because
nobody notices when he does.
[...] Preemption [...] ultimately involves the
larger question whether we really want to
hand the trial lawyers-and the state judges
and politicians they have bought and paid
for-the keys to the national economy. The
answer should be obvious. The solicitor
general's office is no place to launch a
federalism or any other revolution. Neither,
however, need the tenth justice limp behind,
let alone impede, the constitutional
procession that may at long last be getting
on its way. [...]
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THE REHNQUIST COURT'S FEDERALISM REVIVAL: A STATUS REPORT
Pulling Its Punches; The Court took on big issues but rendered few big decisions
Legal Times
July 5, 2004
Tony Mauro
Just before the Supreme Court convened for
its final sitting of the term on June 29,
Solicitor General Theodore Olson was asked
how long it would take for him to recover
from the defeats the Court had handed him
the day before on the legal rights of enemy
combatants and Guantanamo detainees. "I
don't know," was Olson's half-smiling
reply. "I'm not out of the operating room
yet."
Indeed, the Court wasn't finished
conducting major surgery on the
government's positions. Minutes later,
Olson listened as the Court announced
decisions that rejected his stance on the
Child Online Protection Act and did not go
as far as Olson wanted in discouraging
foreigners from bringing tort claims in U.S.
courts.
Yet, as seemed typical for this term, neither
of the Court's final-day rulings had much
finality to them. [. . .]
The decisions symbolized a term in which
the Court left many key issues unresolved
and paused in some of its other notable
trends - most prominently, federalism.
In the area of federalism, the Court in
Tennessee v. Lane offered the clearest signal
this term that its pro-state preferences have
limits. The Court said that when it comes to
physical access for the disabled to state
courthouses, the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990 trumps state
sovereign immunity. The 5-4 ruling found
that imposing a ccessibility requirements on
states was a valid exercise of congressional
power under the 14th Amendment.
In a number of other cases, the Court was
also content to allow federal courts or laws
to dominate over state actions. In Hibbs v.
Winn, the Court ruled that state tax credits
for parochial school tuition can be
challenged in federal court. In Engine
Manufacturers Association v. South Coast
Air Quality Management District and
Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation v. EPA, the Court decided that
the federal Clean Air Act pre-empted state
regulations that were in one instance stricter
than federal standards and in the other less
strict. Less surprisingly, in Aetna Health Inc.
v. Davila, the Court found that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
with its explicit pre-emption provisions,
trumps state tort law.
In these cases and others, the pro-federal
outcomes were often welcomed by the
business community, which usually argues
that it prefers a single federal regulatory
regime over 50 different state ones.
University of Notre Dame law professor
Richard Garnett also sees this term's rulings
in Blakely v. Washington and Locke v.
Davey through a federalism lens. Blakely
rejects state experimentation in sentencing,
imposing a federal standard that requires
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juries, not judges, to decide facts that
increase sentences, even within statutory
maximums. The impact of the ruling will be
felt for years at both the state and federal
levels.
Locke v. Davey, on the other hand, gives
states a somewhat freer hand to experiment
with policies that test the limits of the First
Amendment's religion clauses. .Rehnquist
wrote the majority finding that the free
exercise clause did not bar Washington state
from designing its college scholarship
program to ensure that the state did not
financially support the training of ministers.
But overall, Garnett proclaims that "if there
ever was any revolution" toward state-
oriented federalism, "it's over and in full
retreat."
Michael Greve, who heads the American
Enterprise Institute's Federalism Project,
does not go that far, but agrees that in the
term just ended, federalism cases were "not
as prominent" as they have been in many
recent years. Greve thinks the federalism
jurisprudence of the last decade may have
reached "its natural limits," or that it may
have fallen victim to post-Sept. 11 desire for
a strong federal government. "We're in a
war," Greve says, so the Court's attitude
may be that "federalism is a luxury we
cannot afford."
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The Court's Faux Federalism
A Year at the Supreme Court (2004)
Ramesh Ponnuru
Speaking soon after the end of the 2002
Supreme Court term, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg said, "Federalism this term was
the dog that did not bark." The expression
traces back to the Sherlock Holmes story
"The Adventure of Silver Blaze," where the
dog's silence provides evidence about a
theft. Have the justices carted off the
Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution
while we weren't looking?
The states did not fare well in the Court's
last term. The case most widely taken as a
defeat was Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, in which a six-justice
majority led by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist ruled that Congress had the power
to subject state governments to lawsuits
under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
The states might have thought this would be
an easy win, based on previous Court rulings
restricting the ability of Congress to
authorize lawsuits against state
governments. The majority found, however,
that the Family and Medical Leave Act was
meant to combat an "invalid gender
stereotype" (specifically, the view that
mothers are more likely than fathers to stay
home to take care of their children, which
we all know is a ludicrous folk belief based
on no underlying reality). As such, the act
fell within the scope of Congress's power,
under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to enforce the egalitarian
requirements of that amendment on the
states. This reasoning would doubtless have
come as a surprise to most of the
congressmen and senators who voted for the
act, who thought they were merely
mandating a popular benefit rather than
striking a blow for feminism.
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt
was the next most prominent federalism case
that went badly for the states. Hyatt had left
California for the friendlier tax climate of
Nevada. The California tax authorities
pursued him there, allegedly committing
torts against Hyatt in both states. Hyatt sued,
and the Nevada Supreme Court found that
the suit should proceed under Nevada law.
California, backed by most state attorneys
general, protested that Nevada's courts had
to give weight to California law. The U.S.
Supreme Court turned back the AGs,
affirming the Nevada court's decision.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell was another nationalist
win: The Supreme Court restricted state
courts' ability to impose punitive damages.
Hillside Dairy v. Lyons reaffirmed the
"dormant commerce clause": State
governments may be barred from interfering
with interstate commerce even when
Congress has not explicitly acted to bar
them. In Pierce County v. Guillen, Congress
was allowed to order state courts (as well as
federal courts) not to accept certain kinds of
evidence. This order was designed to
restrain litigation that would adversely affect
interstate commerce, and was thus held to be
a legitimate exercise of Congress's
commerce-clause powers. In American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the
Court said that a presidential agreement with
a foreign country could pre-empt state law-
even if the agreement itself does not say that
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it pre-empts state law, and even if there is no
formal agreement at all.
There were a few cases on the other side of
the ledger. The Court's decisions regarding
affirmative action granted states some
autonomy in setting the admissions policies
at state universities: The Court neither
required nor prohibited preferential
affirmative action. In Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Maine, the Court upheld a Maine program
that pressured drugmakers to hold prices
down. Kentucky Association of Health Plans
v. Miller read federal law to allow states
more freedom to regulate health insurance.
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Court
rejected a claim that federal regulation pre-
empted state lawsuits. As barks go, these
were rather quiet.
It would go too far to say that the 2002 term
means that the federalist revolution is over.
The near-landmark decisions associated with
that revolution have n either been overruled
nor rendered dead letters; the Court has left
itself the freedom to invalidate future
congressional acts for trampling on the
states. The Court has not retreated entirely
from the "clear statement" rule announced a
decade ago: To pre-empt state law, Congress
has to say that's what it's doing. It could
even be argued that the 2002 term
represented a continuation, or rather a
consolidation, of the federalist revolution:
By signaling that this revolution would not
go too far, the swing justices were trying to
get the nationalist judges to make their
peace with it.
But perhaps the federalist revolution is
neither ending nor being consolidated. There
is a third alternative: There never was a
federalist revolution-or, at least, the
revolution was never what it was cracked up
to be.
Ill. HITTING A WALL
For all the fears the Court's federalist turn
inspired, there was a natural limit to how far
it could go. Three constraints were bound to
affect the Court eventually. In 2002-2003,
the Court ran into all three of them.
The first constraint is a straightforward
political one: The Court cannot implement a
federalism agenda that is seen as rolling
back e ither t he N ew D eal or c ivil rights in
any serious way. Moreover, the Court has no
interest in doing so-perhaps in part because
key justices do not want their federalist turn
to be interpreted as an attack on the New
Deal or civil rights. Obviously, however,
this limit means that a vast range of federal
action will be untouched by the Court's
federalism.
The Court is not going to get back into the
business of distinguishing between intrastate
and interstate commerce, and invalidating
congressional regulation of the former; it left
that field for good in the 1930s. It is not
going to distinguish " commerce among the
states" from manufacture. Most federal
economic regulation will be upheld.
This reluctance to go too far politically may
explain why the Court did what it did in
Hibbs. Morrison implicated civil rights at
least as much as Hibbs did, of course, but
only in a symbolic way. Hibbs involved an
intersection of an alleged civil-rights
concern and a federally-mandated economic
benefit. That may have been too much for
the Court to threaten. If the distinction
between Hibbs and Morrison is hard to
ascertain, however, it is less difficult to see
what separates it from the other sovereign
immunity cases. The Court is willing to
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protect states from lawsuits in federal
court unless those lawsuits allege
particular kinds of state discrimination.
Specifically, lawsuits are allowed to combat
discrimination against groups that the Court
itself has identified as "suspect classes":
women, racial minorities, and (weirdly
enough) railroads. When states enact laws
that discriminate against these classes, the
Court subjects those laws to "strict scrutiny"
and will generally invalidate them.
Evidently, the Court will also subject
lawsuits concerning state discrimination
against other c lasses-e.g., the o Id and the
disabled-to what might be called a kind of
strict scrutiny. In Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents (2000), states were held to be
immune from lawsuits under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act even
when Congress was found to have sought to
abrogate their immunity. In Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett (2001), states received immunity
from Americans with Disabilities Act
lawsuits, too. The rule that women and
racial minorities can sue and other groups
can't is, in my view, the most plausible
reading of Hibbs.
The second constraint is the Court's own
confusion about what federalism is. The
Court's federalism cases are replete with
references to the "dignity," "status," and
"interests" of states. The states are, in this
view, an interest group with a special claim
on kind treatment from the federal
government. But this is not the only way to
conceive of federalism. Federalism could be
about dividing governmental responsibilities
and ensuring political accountability, and
there is much in the writing of the Founders
to indicate that these imperatives were on
their minds. Insisting on a federalism of this
sort could-would-place limits on state
governments and lead to results they would
find most undignified. You could call it a
federalism for citizens rather than states. Or,
perhaps, a libertarian federalism.
Finally, the federalist turn faces a third
powerful constraint: The Court's
unwillingness to police the boundaries of
federalism against itself. We forget,
sometimes, when we speak of the Supreme
Court's restricting or expanding what
government can do, that the Court is itself
part of the federal government. For the
Supreme Court to protect the states from the
federal government, it must not only restrain
Congress (and the president). It must
restrain itself. It must reduce its own power.
This it has shown no interest in doing.
As has often been noted, none of the
landmark Warren and Burger Court
individual rights cases, most of which
undermined state autonomy, have been
overturned. What may be more important is
the reason for the Court's reluctance to
revisit these issues. There is some evidence
that the Court's is motivated by a concern
for its own institutional authority as much as
for legal stability. The Court has said as
much in one high-profile case, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case re-
affirming the "central holding" of Roe v.
Wade (1973).
The Casey Court begins by noting the
scandal of disagreement:
Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years
after our holding that the
Constitution protects a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy in
its early stages, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), that definition of
liberty is still questioned. Joining the
respondents as amicus curiae, the
United States, as it has done in five
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other cases in the last decade, again
asks us to overrule Roe.
An intolerance for national division, for
conflict, is not the most promising of
mindsets for the agents of a federalist
revolution to have. Nor is the sense that our
national identity is as fragile as the Casey
plurality believes it to be. To the extent that
Roe itself generated fierce political conflict,
the Court has started an "implosive cycle":
The Court's centralizing moves produce
conflict, which then justify further assertions
of the Court's national authority.
may expand. But after two decades, we
have an answer to one question. Is the
Supreme Court likely to lead a revival of the
federalism contemplated by the Founders?
The answer is no. That dog will not bark
again.
The great federalist case of the 2002 term
was thus not Hibbs but Lawrence v. Texas.
State laws against sodomy were dying off,
as they should have been. But the Court was
not willing to wait. Instead, it issued an
expansive ruling about liberty "in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions."
Nobody was sure what to make of that
phrase, or agree on the implications of the
ruling for other policy issues. But it is clear
that the decision was not good news for
social conservatives, even those who held no
brief for sodomy laws themselves. Once
again, the Court has taken sides in the
culture wars-and taken the same side.
The Supreme Court may very well impose
more marginal restrictions on congressional
power against the states in the 2003 term
and in terms to come. (It will always be
possible to distinguish away Hibbs when the
Court has the inclination to do so. The
Court can just manipulate the level of
deference to Congress to reach the desired
result.) The sovereign-immunity doctrine
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What Brown Teaches Us About the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Revival
PS
April 2004
Neal Devins
[...][R]ecent Rehnquist Court decision-
making invalidating federal statutes is also
tied to social and political forces. This seems
especially true of the Court's pursuit of
federalism-related innovation, although the
forces contributing to this federalism revival
help explain the Court's willingness to strike
down several other statutes.
First, unlike social issues, lawmakers barely
mentioned federalism in the confirmation
hearing, committee reports, or floor debates
concerning any member of the Rehnquist
Court. For example, the Senate Judiciary
Committee never pressed Sandra Day
O'Connor about states rights-even though
O'Connor asserted that her "experience[s] as
a State court judge and as a state legislator"
gave her "a greater appreciation of the
important roles that States play in our
federal system." Correspondingly, there are
virtually no mentions of federalism in
interest group testimony and written
submissions. With no interest group
constituency pressuring Congress on
federalism issues, the Senate has not used its
confirmation power to push the Court to
embrace pro-Congress positions in
federalism cases.
Second, Congress is widely held in
disrepute, partly because of the well known
inclination of candidates to run for Congress
by running against it. As compared to
respondents in 1964 (when 76% of those
polled though that the federal government
could be trusted "just about always" or
"most of the time"), 27% of respondents in
2001 think the government trustworthy. By
a 74% to 17% margin, a 1997 poll revealed
that Americans think that members of
Congress care more about making
themselves look better than making the
country better. In 1992, 82% of those polled
thought that people elected to Congress
"lose touch with the people pretty quickly."
Relatedly, Republicans took over Congress
in 1994 by running on the "Contract with
America." Seeking to capitalize on
widespread vote dissatisfaction, the Contract
pledged a smaller federal government and a
larger role for the states. The Contract
promised: item veto legislation (because
Congress could not be trusted to enact
responsible spending bills); unfunded
mandate reform (because Congress could
not be trusted to respect state prerogatives);
and a vote on a constitutional amendment to
establish term limits (because members of
Congress quickly lost touch with their
constituents).
Third, Congress has signaled to the Court
that it has little institutional stake in
federalism issues and that the Court will pay
little, if any, institutional price when
invalidating legislation on federalism-related
grounds. In the wake of recent rulings
limiting congressional power, there has been
no talk of stripping the Court of jurisdiction,
of amending the Constitution, or of enacting
legislation at odds with these decisions.
Indeed, there has been virtually no talk at
all; the precedential effects of Court
decisions limiting federal power are rarely
mentioned in the Congressional Record or
in political discourse more generally.
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Moreover, with the exception of Court
rulings invalidating the Violence Against
Women Act and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, no more than four
comments exist about the wisdom of the
Court's federalism-related decisions.
Furthermore, these decisions played no role
in the 2000 elections. Finally, Congress has
shown relatively little interest in rewriting
the statutes, and when Congress has
revisited its handiwork, lawmakers have
paid close attention to the Supreme Court's
ruling, limiting their efforts to revisions the
Court is likely to approve.
Rehnquist Court innovation in the
federalism arena has also been incremental.
Only after the 1994 election did the Court
launch its c ounterrevolution, and even then
it moved gingerly, striking down relatively
few laws on somewhat ambiguous grounds.
Today, however, the Court seems more
aggressive, and with good reason. Congress
certainly accepts and may even approve of
Court efforts to curtail federal power.
Moreover, there is little reason to fear a
populist backlash. The Court remains
politically popular and somewhat middle of
the road on divisive social issues. Also,
when the Court strikes down a law, it
typically leaves Congress room to revisit the
issue.
When striking down federal and state
legislation, the Supreme Court is often
described as "countermajoritarian." Such
decision making, as Alexander Bickel put it,
"thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; [the]
Court exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it." Warren
Court school desegregation decision making
and Rehnquist Court federalism rulings,
purportedly classic examples of
countermajoritarian behavior, are, on closer
examination, very much tied to majoritarian
social and political forces. Both Brown and
the federalism revival match changes in
public opinion and signals sent to the Court
by Congress, the White House, and the
American people. Likewise, social and
political forces help explain both the
Rehnquist Court's willingness to extend its
federalism revolution and the Warren
Court's decision to steer clear of school
desegregation for the decade following
Brown.
Parallels between the Warren and Rehnquist
Courts are hardly surprising. When striking
down legislation, the Supreme Court almost
always takes its cues from elected officials,
the public, or elites (academics, journalists,
and other opinion leaders). Court behavior
in the two eras move in different directions,
to be sure. Brown advanced civil rights
interests and Rehnquist Court federalism
decisions have invalidated legislation
protecting the interests of religious
minorities, the elderly, the disabled, and
victims of domestic violence. But both
suggest a Court operating within boundaries
established by social and political context.
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He'll Look Better When He's Gone
The Washington Post
June 8, 2003
Simon Lazarus
Whether Supreme Court Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist resigns at the end of
the court's term this month or waits until a
second Bush term, his reign is likely to look
kinder and gentler in retrospect than the one
his liberal critics have often described. In
1986, Senate Majority Leader George
Mitchell urged his fellow Democrats to
oppose Rehnquist's elevation from associate
to chief justice because he considered the
nominee "totally hostile to the rights of
women and minorities," with a mind "closed
on the issues of race." Last year, American
University constitutional law expert Herman
Schwartz lamented that under Rehnquist's
leadership, "Ronald Reagan's efforts to
reshape the American judiciary have
succeeded."
But in time, the critics will mellow as it
becomes clear that the Rehnquist term has
sustained, not overturned, the major works
of his predecessors, Chief Justices Earl
Warren and Warren Burger. More
important, the Rehnquist term will appear
more pragmatic and centrist than it does
now because the court under his successor is
likely to lurch much further to the right.
What Rehnquist has done over the past
decade by expounding his philosophy of
"federalism," which shifts power from the
government to the states, is to lay the
doctrinal groundwork for a genuinely radical
transformation of the federal government's
authority to make and enforce social policy.
He has set the table. The feast awaits his
successor.
To put the Rehnquist record in perspective,
recall the great constitutional controversies
of the past half-century: Forty years ago,
"Impeach Earl Warren" bumper stickers
were ubiquitous, in response to three
blockbuster decisions - B rown v. B oard of
Education (1954), which mandated racial
desegregation in public schools; Baker v.
Carr (1962), which required all legislative
election districts to be apportioned equally
on a one-man, one-vote basis; and Miranda
v. Arizona (1966), which declared that
confessions in criminal cases must be
excluded unless the suspect had first been
warned of his right to counsel and to remain
silent. The Burger Court's blockbuster was
Roe v. Wade (1973), which legalized
abortion. Despite the bumper stickers, and
the campaign promises of presidents Nixon
and Reagan to select judges who would
overturn Miranda and Roe, all four of those
precedents stand today.
Today Brown, of course, enjoys iconic
status (though in 1953, while serving as a
Supreme Court law clerk, Rehnquist
recommended against outlawing
segregation). Baker is so uncontroversial
that few remember that Congress nearly
passed a constitutional amendment to
overturn it. Miranda was reaffirmed in 1999,
in a 7-2 decision written by Rehnquist
himself His court has twice reaffirmed Roe,
though Rehnquist himself dissented.
Barely a week ago, the contrast between the
court's pragmatic present and its potentially
doctrinaire future was vividly displayed
when the chief justice stunned observers by
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writing a 6-3 decision not to block state
government workers from suing their
employers for violating the 1993 Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Since the mid-
1990s, the five "conservative" justices
(Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor) had stuck together in decision
after decision to pare back congressional
authority over the states. In 2000 they
invalidated provisions of the 1967 Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
empowering state employees to sue their
employers for violations. A year later, the
same majority stripped state employees of
their right to sue for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. So this
year, most observers expected the majority
to make short shrift of the attempt of a
Nevada state employee to sue when he was
fired in alleged violation of the FMLA, in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs.
Certainly nothing in the chief justice's
record suggested that he would vote to
subordinate state sovereignty to the FMLA,
much less write the opinion. He is the
principal architect of the court's current
drive to strengthen state "sovereignty" and
"dignity," as he and his colleagues often put
it in decisions, and to limit congressional
authority to powers specifically
"enumerated" in the Constitution. It is the
only real innovation of his tenure. Until the
mid-1990s, when Rehnquist assembled his
pro-states' rights majority, his court played
only defense - reacting to the civil rights
and liberties doctrines of the Warren-Burger
Court agenda. But since 1995, the
conservative majority has been on the
offense with an agenda of its own.
So why did Rehnquist abruptly switch sides
in the Hibbs case? The most plausible
reason is a simple one: damage control.
Rehnquist probably figured he had lost
O'Connor's vote to her often-expressed
aversion to gender discrimination. Hence,
his side would lose 5-4 anyway. If he went
along with the majority, it wouldn't change
the result but would give him the chance to
name who wrote the opinion. (The chief
justice has that privilege for whichever side
he is on.) So he could name himself and
keep one of the opponents of his federalism
cause from writing an opinion that might do
it more long-term harm. And, indeed,
Rehnquist's opinion is laced with deft
caveats and qualifications that could make it
comparatively easy for future courts to
distinguish this case, and treat it as an
aberration rather than a significant
precedent.
But if Rehnquist appears in the Hibbs case
as a pragmatic and judicious moderate, his
dissenting colleagues on the right - Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy - showcase
the historic sweep of their uncompromising
assault on congressional power. Particularly
revealing is Kennedy's scornful dismissal of
FMLA, which requires employers to grant a
minimum of 12 weeks of unpaid leave per
year for "family and medical" reasons.
Kennedy called this an unjustified
"entitlement program" - an affirmative grant
of rights - rather than a legitimate remedy
for discrimination.
This argument echoed the decisions of a
Supreme Court majority just after the Civil
War that were aimed at shelving the 14th
Amendment and blocking development of a
nationwide code of federally protected
individual rights. The current majority has
recently revived some of these long-dormant
cases of the 1870s and 1880s, which
undermined Reconstruction.
Most remarkably, in his Hibbs dissent,
Justice Kennedy directly attacked a
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landmark precedent from the modem civil
rights era. He quoted at length (and cited as
if it were law) a 1966 dissenting opinion that
disputed the legality of the nationwide ban
on voter literacy tests.
These sparks from the Hibbs debate about
Congress's power to enforce civil rights
shed light on the president's oft-repeated
pledge to nominate judges like Scalia and
Thomas. To the devoutly conservative
administration lawyers who recommend
judicial candidates to the president, this is
not simply a campaign slogan. To them, it
means like Scalia and Thomas and not like
Souter or O'Connor or even Rehnquist.
The odds are that the Senate will soon have
a chance to determine whether the Supreme
Court will continue in the mold of the
Rehnquist Court - usually to the right of
center but cautious, sometimes messy, and
in major cases, often unpredictable - or
whether the next chief justice will have the
inclination and the votes to take the court,
and the country, in a very different direction.
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Steady Rationale at Court Despite Apparent Bend
The New York Times
May 29, 2003
Linda Greenhouse
At first glance, the Supreme Court appeared
to have been overcome on Tuesday by a
belated case of judicial modesty.
The court stepped back unexpectedly from
the brink of confrontation with Congress to
which a series of recent decisions had
brought it, holding in an opinion by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, no less, that
Congress had an adequate basis for opening
the states to suits by their employees under
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
The law, allowing both women and men to
take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave a year
to care for a sick relative, was a valid
antidote to the "pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is
women's work," the chief justice said. If
Congress chose to make the states
accountable to their workers under this
provision, it was justified in doing so.
Not only the result, but the tone was far
different from decisions in 2000 and 2001
that rejected Congressional efforts to permit
elderly and disabled workers to sue their
state government employers under two
federal antidiscrimination laws that
command widespread popular and
Congressional support.
But rather than an instance of the court
blinking, tacking strategically in the face of
mounting grumbling from Congress, the
decision this week in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs can be seen as a
demonstration of the court's continued
power and its determination to continue
dominating the constitutional conversation
with the supposedly co-equal branch of
government across the street.
The deeper message of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion was that Congress was
free to exercise the discretion the court
chose to give it, and no more. The difference
between the age and disability
discrimination statutes on the one hand and
the family leave act on the other was that the
court had, for the last several decades,
identified sex discrimination as a problem
for which, as with race discrimination,
Congress simply had more freedom to
devise remedies.
If the remedy extended to permitting suits
against states that would otherwise be
entitled under the 11th Amendment to claim
immunity from private lawsuits, so be it, as
long as Congress provided sufficient
evidence that the states themselves were part
of the problem.
Several aspects of this latest decision made
clear the degree to which it represented
continuity rather than a change in the court's
recent direction. While its subject was the
Family and Medical Leave Act, the
decision's analytical core was an
interpretation of Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, under which Congress "shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation" the amendment's substantive
guarantees of equal protection and due
process. The constitutional question was
whether the family leave act's explicit
abrogation of the states' I Ith Amendment
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immunity from suit was "appropriate
legislation" within the scope of Congress's
power under Section 5.
The last time the Supreme Court paid
sustained attention to Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment w as during t he c ivil rights e ra
of the 1960's, and the difference between
then and now is striking. In the earlier
decisions, the court's stance toward
Congress was one of deference, starting
from the presumption that Congress was
acting within the scope of its authority not
only to enforce but, at least to some degree,
also to define the constitutional right at
issue.
In the Rehnquist court's revisiting of Section
5, the burden has shifted. Now, the
presumption is the opposite: that Congress
has to prove that it is acting within the scope
of its authority, a constricted scope that is
limited to enforcement and must stay clear
of any effort at definition. "We distinguish
appropriate prophylactic legislation from
substantive redefinition of the 14th
Amendment right at issue," Chief Justice
Rehnquist said on Tuesday,
Because under the court's equal protection
doctrine, official discrimination on the basis
of age or disability is almost never
unconstitutional, the burden of proof that the
current approach places on Congress proved
insurmountable when it came to extending
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and the Americans With Disabilities Act to
the states.
But because sex discrimination, subject to
"heightened scrutiny" under the court's
precedents, is presumed to be
unconstitutional, Congress could meet the
burden of showing that the Family and
Medical Leave Act was a "congruent and
proportional" response to a pattern of
constitutional violations by the states. The
burden in all cases was the same, as was the
court's insistence on "a monopoly of
interpretive authority over Congress," as
Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel describe
the current situation in a forthcoming article
in the Yale Law Journal.
Further evidence that the decision did not
signal a retreat came from a concurring
opinion by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
Along with Justice John Paul Stevens, who
concurred separately, these three had
dissented in every one of the 11th
Amendment immunity decisions. They
made it clear that while they were happy
enough to join the Rehnquist opinion, they
saw little to embrace in its analysis.
"Even ont his c ourt's view oft he s cope of
Congressional power under Section 5 of the
14th Amendment, the Family and Medical
Leave Act is undoubtedly valid legislation
and application of the act to the states is
constitutional," Justice Souter wrote for the
three. He added: "I join the court's opinion
here without conceding the dissenting
positions" that he and the others had
expressed in the previous cases.
As Justice Souter implied, those dissenting
voices may well be raised again. While there
are no other federalism cases on the docket
now, one issue now in the lower courts is
likely to make its way there soon. The
question is whether Congress acted
appropriately under Section 5 in permitting
states to be sued for failing to provide
accessible public services - transportation,
voting, education a nd t he like - f or p eople
with disabilities.
The public services provisions are in Title II
of the Americans With Disabilities Act; the
court's decision on the act two years ago
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granted the states immunity under Title I,
which covers employment. Earlier this term,
the court agreed to decide a Title II case, but
dismissed it in March when California,
under strong lobbying by the disability
rights community, abandoned its Supreme
Court appeal. That action bought time but
not - at least on the basis of the ruling this
week - a change of heart.
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The Supreme Court v. Balance of Powers
The New York Times
March 3, 2001
Larry D. Kramer
Most Americans believe that politics should
not be part of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
But the Supreme Court is unavoidably a
political as well as a legal institution. And
the current Supreme Court has a definite
political agenda - one devoted chiefly to
reallocating governmental power in ways
that suit the views of its conservative
majority.
The court's recent decision in Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, which ruled that state employees
may not sue their states under the Americans
With Disabilities Act, is but the latest
example of the court's assertion of the
primacy of its views over those of Congress.
The 14th Amendment was adopted primarily
to empower Congress to address civil rights
abuses in the states. The courts also had a
role, but for institutional reasons that role
called for deference to legislative judgments
in all but the most serious cases, like those
involving race.
In the Garrett case, the conservative
majority decided that Congress had not
persuaded it that federal legislation was
really necessary. In effect, the court took
institutional restraints originally placed on
judges to preserve legislative authority and
imposed them on the legislature to preserve
judicial authority.
The Garrett ruling is not really surprising.
For nearly a decade, the court's five
conservative justices have steadily usurped
the power to govern by striking down or
weakening federal and state laws regulating
issues as varied as gun sales, the
environment and patents - as well as laws
protecting women and now the disabled. Not
in every situation, of course, but the general
blueprint is unmistakable. Rather than
serving to chasten the conservative court,
the experience of deciding Bush v. Gore
may have further emboldened it.
Protest against this seizure of legislative
authority has been muted and sporadic,
apparently reflecting the general assumption
that not much can be done. Not so.
Presidents and Congresses in the past never
hesitated to reprimand an overreaching
court.
Under Thomas Jefferson's guidance,
Congress punished the Supreme Court by
delaying its term for a year, threatening to
impeach judges and ordering the justices to
travel around the country hearing minor
disputes. Andrew Jackson and Abraham
Lincoln ignored what they regarded as
unsupportable decisions. Franklin Roosevelt
proposed increasing the size of the court to
dilute an errant five-member majority. And
the Constitution gives Congress control over
the court's budget and its jurisdiction,
powerful tools that the framers deliberately
left in political hands.
Our system of separation of powers depends
on balance among the branches. It does not
give any branch license to run roughshod
over the others. When the court upsets this
balance, the other branches have a duty to
respond, not necessarily through extreme
tactics, but at least through trenchant public
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criticism. Yet the conservative court's
decisions have met with only tepid
responses from critics in the rest of
government. This may be because liberals
and moderates are inhibited by a false belief
that the Supreme Court is a fragile
institution that needs to be protected from
public censure. Liberals are largely
responsible for promoting this myth in the
years after Brown v. Board of Education, in
reaction to the relentless conservative attack
on the court in the days of Chief Justice Earl
Warren. Many liberals now assume that
criticizing the court plays into the
conservatives' hands.
Precisely the opposite is true. Conservatives
never hesitate to attack a court that does
things they don't like. Just ask the justices of
the Florida Supreme Court. Liberals never
used to hesitate, either. By sitting on their
hands now, critics merely encourage the
court's conservative majority.
The court has survived, and thrived, for
more than two centuries, despite regular
confrontations with the other branches of
government. It cannot and should not be
treated as if its rulings are not political or are
above censure. No one is suggesting that we
savage the court every time it renders an
unpopular decision. But vocal opposition is
appropriate when the court consistently
interprets the Constitution in a way that does
not protect individual rights, but limits the
ability of Congress to do so.
The conservative justices seem to have
grown comfortable reading the Constitution
in ways that ignore precedent, past practice
and the considered judgment of other
government institutions. This must be
resisted. We need to hear from our political
leaders.
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